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CHAPTER 1
Folk Songs and Nationalism in China
Introduction
In China, there are 56 ethnic groups, with the Han ethnic group being the largest.1 After
the collapse of the Qing dynasty in the early 1900s, the creation of a “Chinese identity” became
an important issue for the Chinese Nationalist Party, because national identity was a novel,
Western concept.2 Eventually, the “Chinese identity” became associated to the Han ethnicity to
the extent that many scholars refer to Chinese nationalism as “racial nationalism”, because it
promotes the myth of a uniform Han race with a common descent and culture.3
Under the current Chinese Communist Party (CCP), however, this racial nationalism has
become problematic, as ethnic groups such as the Tibetans and Uyghurs have increasingly
voiced their desire for independence.4 Furthermore, domestic issues such as pollution,
corruption, and inequality have become publicized sources of discontent among the general
population.5 Thus, promoting nationalism in China, but in a more inclusive way than with the
conventional focus on Han nationality, has become more important today than it has been in the
last ten years for the continuity of the CCP.
The CCP’s cultural policy is a significant element of its promotion of nationalism.6 And
music, which is an influential vector of nationalist discourse, features predominantly in its
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cultural policy.7 This thesis explores folk songs, or min’ge, because folk music is an essential
part of ethnic identity. Folk music in China dates back more than 3,000 years and reflects the
social, emotional, and spiritual lives of the people.8 In China, there are hundreds of types of folk
songs differentiated by region, ethnic group, and the occasion in which the songs are performed.
These folk songs range from courting songs of the Dai minority in southern China to religious
songs performed by Tibetan monks.9 By definition, the creation and popularization of min’ge is
an organic process, but since the Yan'an Forum on Literature and Art in 1942, where Mao
Zedong encouraged the use of folk songs to spread Communist ideals, there has been the
tendency for Han artists and composers to appropriate ethnic minority folk music for both
political and nonpolitical reasons.10
In contrast to the diversity of traditional folk music, revolutionary songs, or hong’ge, are
homogeneous in content and written for the sole purpose of propagating and glorifying Party
policy or the wisdom of its leaders.11 Hong’ge is perhaps more well-known by its English
translation, “red songs”. In addition to praising the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP)
leadership and achievements, hong’ge also promotes revolutionary idealism and ethics
associated to the Chinese communist movement.12 The development of hong’ge and its
popularization during the Communist Revolution reflects a significant turning point in Chinese
music, as much of the music composed after the 1940s was similarly politicized.13
In China today, min’ge exists alongside hong’ge and enjoys a comparable amount of
popularity and state support. In fact, it is not uncommon to hear many different kinds of ethnic
7

Jingzhi Liu. A Critical History of New Music in China. Trans. Caroline Mason. Hong Kong: Chinese UP, 2010.
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12
Liu, 85.
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folk songs on state-sponsored television channels, and the study of min’ge is a mandatory part of
curriculum at most music conservatories.14 However, the genre of min’ge has significantly
changed from China’s pre-Communist era to present day.15 Thus, min’ge today may not be as
representative of ethnic identity today as it was before the 1940s. These observations led to the
following questions: why does the CCP support and promote min’ge, and what is the nature of
min’ge today?
In order to make sense of the current policy of supporting and promoting folk music, I
will analyze the musical forms of popular music from three different time periods: the 1930s 1960s, 1960s - 1970s, and the 1970s - 1990s. These time periods reflect major changes in CCP
policies and important historical events, including the Second Sino-Japanese War, Yan’an
Forum, Cultural Revolution, and Deng Xiaoping’s Open Door Policy. I will then explore the
genre of min’ge in depth and compare its development to the development of popular music in
general. Finally, to determine the basis of the current support for and promotion of min’ge, I will
examine the utility of min’ge in the context of the current dynamics of nationalism within China.
Ultimately, my goal is to provide new insight into the mechanisms of Chinese nationalism, and
shed light on the CCP’s relationship with ethnic minorities.

14
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Literature Review
What is “Chinese Nationalism”?
In the broad body of literature on nationalism, there are two main schools of thought. The
modernist school of thought focuses on actions undertaken by individuals, mostly intellectuals,
with the specific purpose of engendering sentiments of nationalism within a specific group of
people.16 In other words, the modernist view is that nationalism is in a sense man-made, and
born out of the structural conditions of modern society. The primordialist school of thought
focuses on the natural tendency of humans to organize into distinct groupings based on an
affinity of birth.17 The primordialist view is that nationalism is inherent in human beings, and is
a natural phenomenon.
The study of nationalism tends to lend itself to the modernist point of view, due to the
artificiality of national identity.18 In China, this is consistent with the fact that the concept of
nationality only developed in the late Qing dynasty. Chow states, “Chinese intellectuals looked
to language, custom, history, and religion for the common bond of a nation. They found none”.19
Consequently, the concept of hanzu, or “people of Han lineage”, was artificially created by antiManchu scholars to attack the Qing dynasty.20 Influenced by the Western concept of “race”,
these revolutionary scholars began to search for new identities for the Chinese nation in order to
create a distinction between the ruling Manchus and the people.21 Since its creation, the concept
of hanzu, which I will refer to as the “Han identity”, has been utilized for a number of political

Sarah Cole. “Nationalism and Modernism”, MFS Modern Fiction Studies 48.2 (2002): 453.
Josep R. Llobera. "Recent Theories of Nationalism." University College London Working Papers (1999): 3.
18
Yingjie Guo. Cultural Nationalism in Contemporary China: The Search for National Identity Under Reform.
London: Routledge, 2004.
19
Kai-wing Chow, Kevin M. Doak, and Poshek Fu, eds. Constructing Nationhood in Modern East Asia. Ann Arbor:
U of Michigan, 2001.
20
Chow, Doak, and Fu, 75.
21
Gladney, 180.
16
17
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purposes, including resistance to the Japanese during the Guomindang’s rule.22 Thus, most
authors view nationalism from the early 1900s to end of the Mao era in the 1970s as created by
the state.23
However, although national identity in China is inherently a modern construct, the
dynamics of nationalism have evolved over time. For example, popular nationalism, which is
Han based but receives support from minorities as well, supports the idea that national identity
can originate from the people, as posited by the primordialist theory.24 In fact, Gries argues that
the emergence of this popular nationalism has become a threat to the government, resulting in the
formation of “pragmatic nationalism” in recent years.25 Guo also notes that cultural nationalism,
though primordialist nature, is often an extension of state nationalism in China, which is
inherently modernist.26 Thus, the lines between primordialist and modernist thought are blurred
in the analysis of contemporary Chinese nationalism, requiring one to gain a more nuanced
understanding of whether nationalism is a top-down or bottom-up phenomenon.
The following four categories of nationalism are selected for examination: state
nationalism, Han nationalism, popular nationalism, and pragmatic nationalism. The analysis of
music and nationalism requires examining these topics in depth, because each category sheds
light on a unique aspect of Chinese national identity. Furthermore, although the four categories
are distinct and seemingly unrelated, they should be viewed as a whole in order to understand the
various mechanisms through which nationalism is constructed. Thus, music is important in this
framework because it has the potential to provide the bridge between these four categories of
nationalism. While the following sections will provide overviews into the four categories, the
22

Davis, 130.
Gladney 1994; Lowell Dittmer and Samuel S. Kim, eds. China's Quest for National Identity. Ithaca: Cornell UP,
1993.; Chow, Doak, and Fu 2001.
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discussion section of this chapter will highlight the apparent distinctions between the theories
and offer new insight into how music fits into these nationalist frameworks.

State Nationalism
One way of analyzing state nationalism is to examine the state’s cultural policies and
their effects on national identity. Enze Han presents a thorough analysis of state nationalism by
distinguishing between three periods of “nation-building”: 1. The tolerant and pluralistic policies
of the early years, 2. The cultural destruction and political repression of the Cultural Revolution,
and 3. The return to a more pluralistic approach, but with significant limitations in today’s
society.
During the first stage, the CCP’s policies towards ethnic minorities were relatively
inclusive.27 Although the CCP did not include a clause allowing ethnic minorities to pursue selfdetermination in its constitution, minority languages were promoted and protected. For example,
Article 53 of the Common Program, the provisional constitution for the PRC passed in 1949,
“guaranteed ethnic minorities the right to develop and use their native languages and scripts...
and promised government assistance in those efforts”.28 In addition, the 1952 General Program
for the Implementation of Regional Autonomy, the 1953 Election Law, and the PRC
Constitution of 1954 all mandated proportional minority membership in legislative bodies,
pledged that ethnic minorities would have the same rights as the Han majority, and banned
discrimination based on ethnicity.29
During the late 1960s, many of these policies were reversed. Dittmer notes, “During the
Cultural Revolution, radical factions of the CCP grew impatient with the slow pace in national
27

Han, 50.
Ibid, 52.
29
Sujian Guo and Baogang Guo, 140.
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6

integration”.30 Bilingual education for ethnic minorities was either stopped entirely or drastically
curtailed in, ethnic minority organizations were disbanded, and passages dealing with minority
autonomy in the Constitution were eliminated.31 Many autonomous units were dissolved and
ethnic minority leaders were deposed, and often persecuted.32 Most importantly, the suffering
caused by these policies created irreparable damage to the relations between the Han and ethnic
minorities.33
The return to more tolerant and pluralistic policies began after Mao’s death in 1976.34
Members of the old minority elites were restored to their previous positions in government, legal
reforms provided more institutionalized autonomy and rights for various ethnic minority groups,
and bilingualism was once again permitted and promoted.35 In addition, affirmation action for
minority students applying to university, exceptions to the one-child policy, and quotas for
representation in the government were all instituted to ensure equality between ethnic minorities
and the Han.36 In recent years, it appears as though the government not only accepts minorities,
but intends to highlight China’s diversity on the international level through supporting initiatives
such as creating films on ethnic minorities and developing ethnic tourism.37
However, despite the many policies favoring minorities, many authors agree that these
policies are only superficial attempts at promoting equality, and in effect, minorities continue to
be marginalized in society.38 Some authors even criticize the Chinese government’s lack of
proactive and effective policy as a deliberate neglect, because it is obvious that the laws
30

Dittmer and Kim, 89.
Davis, 45.
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Han, 112.
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Ibid, 132.
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Joseph Tse-Hei Lee, Lida V. Nedilsky, and Siu-Keung Cheung, eds. China’s Rise to Power: Conceptions of State
Governance. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012. 89.
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governing ethnic-minority cultural rights and political autonomy are becoming increasingly
inadequate in the context of the rapid economic and social change in China.39 For example,
although preferential university admission for minority students is still in place, the system
through which the government would automatically assign jobs to university graduates is not.40
Thus, ethnic minority students often find themselves at a disadvantage when competing with Han
Chinese students for jobs that require substantial proficiency in Mandarin Chinese.41 In addition,
with economic development focused in the urban centers where Han Chinese are the majority,
more and more ethnic minority individuals, who are disproportionately male, have chosen to
leave their villages for economic opportunities.42 This has ultimately threatened the survival of
ethnic minority culture, because many of these men do not return to village life and instead
choose to assimilate into the Han culture and way of living.43

Han Nationalism
As discussed previously, the concept of hanzu, or the “Han identity”, is undoubtedly
artificial and highly politicized. The CCP, like the Guomintang and the revolutionaries before
them, has utilized the Han identity to create a sense of pride among people who supposedly share
Han cultural values, and to gain support for their political agenda of unification.44 Thus, the
boundaries between cultural nationalism and state nationalism are undoubtedly blurred because
the two categories are closely related.45 However, whereas state nationalism focuses on policies
directed at ethnic minorities, cultural nationalism focuses on the indirect subjugation of ethnic

39

Jeffrey N. Wasserstrom. China in the 21st Century: What Everyone Needs to Know. New York, NY: Oxford UP,
2010. 77.
40
Ibid, 80.
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minorities – for example, through the portrayal of the Han as superior, and the indirect pressures
on ethnic minorities to assimilate. From a broader perspective, the CCP has effectively
combined cultural and state nationalism to create a new type of nationalism - Han nationalism.46
From the beginning of the People’s Republic, the Han people have been celebrated by the
Communist Party as the “vanguard of the people’s revolution”.47 For example, a cable issued by
the Central Party Propaganda Office of the New China News Agency in 1949 stated, “The Han
occupy the majority population of the country; moreover, the Han today are the major force in
China’s revolution. Under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, the victory of China’s
people’s democratic revolution mainly relied on the industry of the Han people”. 48 In the Ethnic
Identification Project, the Chinese government classified minority groups according to what
historical development stage it considered them to have reached. The Han majority group was
classified as the one that had progressed furthest into the feudal stage, while other groups were
labeled “primitive”, “slave”, or “feudal”.49 Though today, there are laws prohibiting the explicit
discrimination of ethnic minorities, Han superiority is still asserted in implicit ways.
In a subtler way, the policies of the CCP today assert the superiority of the Han by
pressuring ethnic minorities to adopt the Han language and customs. Many authors refer to the
assimilation of ethnic minorities as “sinification”, or huanhua.50 Han notes, “Today, it is very
hard for younger-generation ethnic-minority people to grow up in a monolingual environment.
Mass media, modern communication channels, pop culture, and all the conveniences and
excitements offered by contemporary Chinese society all require one, especially a young person,

44

Gladney, 188.
Ibid, 180.
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Zheng, 214.
47
Gladney, 181.
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to conform, acculturate, or assimilate into the majority Han language and culture”.51 Recent
nation-building policies such as the prohibition of under 18 years-olds from praying at mosques
and the banning of civil servants and students from fasting during the month of Ramadan are
examples of even stronger measures taken to accelerate sinification.52
Additionally, the dynamics of the Han identity under the CCP reflect the purposes of Han
nationalism. Gladney argues, “the identification of certain groups within China as ‘minorities’
and the recognition of the Han as a ‘unified’ majority played a fundamental role in forging a
unified Chinese nation, because minorities were induced to follow the Han example”.53 Chow
also notes the importance of the Han identity in politics. He notes, “This myth [of a hanzu] also
sustains a belief that there is a majority ethnic group that is running the government, therefore
justifying domination over ‘minority ethnic groups’ such as the Tibetans and the Uighurs, who
are ‘less civilized and advanced’”.54 However, Chow also points out that the Han identity “has
allowed political leaders to hide conflicts and tensions between ethnic groups within the
hanzu”.55 Therefore, Han identity is simultaneously inclusive and exclusive - reflecting the
CCP’s desire to consolidate power in the “Han majority” and weaken the autonomy of ethnic
minorities.

Popular Nationalism
Whereas state nationalism and Han nationalism focus on the dynamics of ethnic identity,
popular nationalism and pragmatic nationalism focus on allegiance to the state. In some ways,
these differences can be demarcated as internal and external nationalism – where internal
51

Han, 122.
Emily Rauhala. "The Politics of Pop in China's Xinjiang Region." Time Magazine, 2014.
53
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nationalism refers to how one ethnic group within a country perceives themselves in comparison
to other ethnic groups, and external nationalism is how citizens of a country perceive themselves
in relation to other countries.
Although many Western scholars insist that Chinese nationalism has always been a topdown phenomenon, it is clear that popular nationalism has been prevalent throughout modern
Chinese history, and in fact, has defined much of its course. The Boxer Rebellion in 1900, for
example, was an uprising in northern China against the spread of Western and Japanese
influence.56 Members of this group, known as Boxers, were peasants mainly from the Shandong
province, which was struck by several instances of famine and flooding during the late 1800s. In
the 1890s, China had given territorial and commercial concessions in this area to several
European nations, and the Boxers blamed their poor standard of living on the foreigners who
were colonizing their country. This rebellion, as one of the first instances in modern Chinese
history where the masses united to protest against foreign imperialism, set the precedent for
popular nationalism through the end of the 20th century and provided inspiration for other antiimperialist protests, such as the May Fourth Movement in 1919, where students protested the
Chinese government's weak response to the Treaty of Versailles.57 In other words, the Boxer
Rebellion and May Fourth Movement gave rise to the “victim narrative” that united the Chinese
people with the idea that China needed to be strong in order to avoid being continually
victimized by foreign powers.
Since its creation, the CCP has relied upon popular nationalism to gain and maintain
support. In line with Marxist thought, much of their success in the Chinese Civil War came from
their ability to appeal to the masses – indeed, the CCP positioned themselves as the “party of the
56
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people” with the goal to “liberate” the masses from oppression by the Guomindang and
imperialist forces.58 However, after the 1949 “liberation” by the CCP, the lines between popular
and state nationalism became difficult to distinguish. Although the state dictated the goals of
nationalism during this time, expressions of nationalism were as much influenced by the people
as they were by the state. Ultimately, the cult of personality achieved by Mao Zedong, combined
with the lasting fervor of revolution, led to popular nationalism defined by fanaticism and
xenophobia.59
The CCP continued to play a significant role in influencing popular nationalism even
after Mao’s death. The anti-Japanese protests of 1996, 2005, and 2012, for example, all reflected
the internalization of the victim narrative perpetuated by Jiang Zemin’s patriotic education
campaign.60 Instead of emphasizing how China “stood up” to foreign aggressors during World
War II as his predecessors did, Jiang Zemin supported a narrative that emphasized the
victimization of the Chinese, especially by Japan.61 For example, Chinese textbooks emphasized
Japan’s invasion of China, but it made no effort to inform Chinese students that postwar Japan
was democratic and pacifist.62 This education has exacerbated existing Sino-Japanese tensions,
causing disputes over the Diaoyu islands and other issues such as Yasukuni shrine visits to easily
spark nationalist outbursts by the people.63
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Pragmatic Nationalism
Popular nationalism, however, is not always beneficial for the state. Just as the masses
can rally behind anger towards the actions of foreign countries, they can also unite to express
their dissatisfaction towards the state. Both the Boxer Rebellion and May Fourth Movement, for
example, expressed anger towards the Chinese government in addition to foreign countries. In a
more contemporary example, although the protests against Japan's claims over the Diaoyu
islands were inherently anti-Japanese, protesters were also largely unsatisfied by the Chinese
government’s response. In fact, in the 1996 national bestseller China Can Say No, the authors
maintain that “China has been too warm and accommodating towards Japan” and implicitly
condemn the government for suppressing popular anti-Japanese protests.64
Popular nationalism also appears to be undermining the state’s agency. Gries states, “In
China today, popular networks are challenging the state’s hegemony over nationalism,
threatening to rupture the Chinese nation-state”.65 For example, in the midst of popular protests
about the 1999 Belgrade bombing, 2001 spy plane collision, and more recent island disputes,
Chinese leaders had no choice but to condemn foreign nations and adopt a hard-line approach to
discerning who was “right” and who was “wrong”.66 As a result, the CCP recognized that
nationalism could be a double-edged sword and began approaching nationalism in a more careful
way, leading to what scholars such as Peter Gries and Suisheng Zhao call “pragmatic
nationalism”.67
Pragmatic nationalism is, in essence, reactive in nature. It does not have a fixed,
objectified, or defined content, and is not driven by any ideology, religion beliefs or other
64
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Ibid, 134.
66
Ibid, 135.
67
Gries 2004; Suisheng Zhao. A Nation-State by Construction: Dynamics of Modern Chinese Nationalism. Stanford,
Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2004.
65

13

abstract ideas.68 Instead, it is an instrument of the state to bolster the faith of Chinese people and
hold the country together during the period of rapid and turbulent transformation from a
Communist to a post-Communist society.69 For example, in response to popular calls for the
government to take a tough position against the United States and Japan, CCP leaders have
mainly adopted a two-pronged strategy.70 On the one hand, they have tolerated and even
encouraged the expression of popular nationalism to make their own policy positions more
credible to the U.S. and Japan on issues involving China’s vital interests such as the sovereignty
of Taiwan.71 On the other hand, the state has been very cautious to prevent the popular
sentiment of Chinese people from getting out of hand and causing backlash in both domestic and
foreign affairs.72 Thus, the CCP has maintained that nationalism must be "channeled" in its
expressions, which has led to the restraining or even banning of popular anti-American and antiJapanese demonstrations.73

Discussion
It is apparent through the examination of these four types of nationalism that there is an
obvious disconnect between state and Han nationalism, and popular and pragmatic nationalism.
Each set presents one primordialist and one modernist theory on nationalism, but the basis of
these two sets seem to be unevenly divided between anthropological and political theories.
Specifically, discussions about state and Han nationalism tend to focus on national and ethnic
identity, whereas discussions about popular and pragmatic nationalism tend to center on
allegiance to the state and the sense of unity among the citizens of country. The discussion about
68
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folk music in China, however, may be related to all four types of nationalism. For example,
while music is a primary means of creating identity, it can also be used to create feelings of
loyalty towards the state. On the other hand, because the popularity of Chinese folk music has
not spread overseas, its significance in the context of nationalism may be limited to its domestic
influence, and thus it may play a greater role in internal nationalism than external nationalism.
In the next section, the role of music, generally, in the discourse on nationalism will be
discussed.

15

The Importance of Music in Nationalism
In examining the importance of music in nationalism, it is crucial to discuss two theories:
ethnosymbolism and banal nationalism. First, the primary argument of ethnosymbolism is that
“the persisting features in the formation and continuity of national identities are myths,
memories, values, traditions, and symbols”.74 From this perspective, music, as the medium
through which the features in the formation and continuity of national identities is transmitted, is
a particularly important aspect of nationalism.
Folk music, however, can play contradictory roles in creating unified national identity.
For example, Leoussi and Grosby state, “the appropriation of folk music often amounted to a
straightforward extension of the policies of Communist regimes following World War II”.75
However, the revival of traditional genres was sometimes “a direct response to nationalist
tensions”, such as when Serbian folk epics accompanied by gusla became popular during the
1990’s.76 This example directly relates to the dynamics of min’ge that will be discussed later in
this thesis. Whereas revolutionary songs reflected a “straightforward extension” of CCP policy,
the ability of certain minority groups to preserve their traditional folk music can be seen through
as ethnosymbolist lens as a form of resistance to Han nationalism. Thus, music not only plays a
significant role in the nation-building efforts of the Communist regimes, but also in the
resistance of ethnic groups to assimilation.
Furthermore, in ethnosymbolism, state-sponsored transformation of folk music is not a
novel concept. For instance, in Belgrade in the 1990’s, turbo-folk, a fusion of “orientalized”
traditional folk melodies and techno-pop, was created as a “a flashy, escapist alternative to

74
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Western pop and rock”.77 Just as turbo-folk “came to stand for conservative, nationalistic values,
well attuned to, and promoted by, the Milosevic regime”78, the CCP’s transformation of min’ge
may represent a new genre of music that promotes loyalty to the Communist Party and Han
nationalism.
Banal nationalism does not focus on the features in the formation and continuity of
national identities, but rather on the subliminal nature of national symbols.79 The term “banal
nationalism”, coined by Michael Billig, refers to “the everyday representations of the nation
which build an imagined sense of national solidarity and belonging amongst humans”.80
Examples of banal nationalism include the presence of flags, sporting events, symbols on money,
national songs. Billig argues that power behind modern nationalism is its "hidden" nature, and
because it remains largely unexamined and unchallenged, it has become the basis for powerful
political movements, and for most political violence in the world today.81 Therefore,
nationalistic songs, due to their popularity, accessibility, and prevalence at everyday events, are
powerful mechanisms for states to promote their agendas.
In this way, the continual presence of min’ge in state-sponsored concerts and on the
China Central Television’s (CCTV) programs is likely very influential in promoting nationalism.
Not only do concerts such as the Chinese New Years’ Gala amass over 700 million views
annually, CCTV’s accessibility and popularity has enabled it to “unconsciously educate the
Chinese people about their nation, the party, dominant ideologies, and current government
policies”.82 The incorporation of nationalistic messages into min’ge could, therefore, be
intentional. Gorfinkel notes, “the creative packaging of political and ideological lessons, or the
77
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masking of politics in popular entertainment, is thought to make propaganda more effective. By
rendering audiences oblivious to their own indoctrination, the state reinforces among the public
the efficacy of its governance”.83 Therefore, due to the “hidden nature” of its nationalistic
elements and its popularity, min’ge could be another extension of the state’s cultural policies.

The theories of ethnosymbolism and banal nationalism give us a clearer picture of the
role of music in promoting nationalism. However, it is still unclear what the role of folk music,
and specifically min’ge, in China’s nationalist framework is. In order to answer this question in
depth, the following chapters will be structured as follows: Chapter 2 will include an analysis of
the nature of popular music from the 1930s to the 1990s in order to identify relevant trends.
Chapter 3 will focus on the development of the specific type of folk song promoted by the CCP
today, and introduce the concept of “cultural hegemony”. Chapter 4 will discuss issues of
representation and national identity that arise from the popularization of the min’ge genre.
Finally, Chapter 5 will summarize the main findings of this paper, and place the findings within
the broader context of Chinese nationalism and the importance of music in creating a national
identity.
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CHAPTER 2
Chinese Music Trends from 1930s - 1990s

Author Sue Tuohy states, “In twentieth-century China, much musical discourse takes no
pains to hide music’s associations with political goals”.84 This musical-political connection has
not been a recent development, but rather a persistent theme throughout the history of Chinese
music.85 In fact, the oldest existing collection of Chinese poetry, Shijing (Book of Songs),
divided music according to states, and it is believed that Confucius could discern a state’s
character by hearing its music.86
For the purposes of this chapter, I begin my inquiry with the onset of the Second SinoJapanese War, due to its significance in creating new types of music that were distinctly
Westernized and nationalistic. I will then outline important historical events from the
establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949 to the 1990s, and describe the musical
trends that resulted from the dramatic changes in the political environment. Although there have
been many significant developments in Chinese music since the 1930s, I will focus on the trends
that have influenced popular music and folk music, and explore certain intersections between the
two genres. Additionally, because the type of minge analyzed in this thesis pertains mainly to
vocal music, there will be a particular emphasis on trends in vocal music, as opposed to
instrumental music.
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Music of the 1930s – 1950s
In 1937, the Second Sino-Japanese War began, disrupting many elements of society,
including the arts.87 Music began to be even more heavily politicized, and many pieces were
composed solely to unite people in the war efforts against the Japanese.88 Additionally,
composers of these nationalist songs, such as Nie Er, Xian Xinghai, and Zhao Yuanren, were
deeply influenced by Western music and developed new types of musical compositions that
incorporated Western elements.89
However, the war was not the only impetus for change. The nationalist songs at the time
reflected the desire for cultural and political reform that had began since the May Fourth
Movement in 1911.90 During this time, intellectuals revered Western ideals and many studied
abroad in Europe, America, or Japan, including the famous composers Xian Xinghai and Zhao
Yuanren.91 This altered the form of music in China, as well as the content. Before, songs were
often descriptive or narrative in nature, but after the concept of nationalism was imported to
China, many composers focused their work on the fate of the country, and patriotism was an
essential element of popular music.92 Author Wai-Chung Ho goes as far to say, “music was
determined not by musical quality but by its political intention”.93
One important musical trend that was a direct product of this politicization of music was
the Mass Singing Movement.94 The socio-political movements of the 1930s required music to
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mobilize the masses against a common enemy, but there were no preexisting Chinese musical
forms that would achieve this purpose.95 Thus, composers began to develop a new type of vocal
music that would be “taken up by the people”, based upon marching songs from the West.96
Musicians and educators also formed small groups such as “Singing for Resistance against
Japan” and the “National Salvation Movement” to promote the revolutionary spirit.97 Ho notes,
“In Shanghai alone, twenty formal music organizations were formed, which initiated Mass
Singing Societies to lift the national spirit in schools and in the countryside”.98 Li Baochen, a
major organizer of the mass singing movement, noted the movement’s impact:
“Not very long ago, the Chinese people thought that singing in public gatherings was
either childish or undignified. The new war songs, however, brought a new
understanding of group-singing; they became a real stimulation of patriotism in their
expression of youthfulness and cooperation. Governmental officials actually opened
their mouths in singing the National Anthem in meetings, and old people gradually
caught on to the spirit and joy of singing with their grand children at home. China
became group-singing conscious”99

The success of the Mass Singing Movement reinforced the idea that music could
effectively serve political purposes, and thus both Nationalists (Guomindang) and Communists
utilized music to further their own campaigns.100 In the New Life Movement, launched by the
Nationalist government in early 1934, songs were used to teach people about the concept of a
“nation” and urged citizens to cultivate their moral character.101 Five years later, in the National
Spiritual Mobilization Movement, mass singing was used as a means to rally people behind the
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Nationalist government.102 The national anthem adopted by the Guomindang during this time
reflects the new spirit of patriotism that these massing singing campaigns promoted. Its lyrics
state:
San Min Chu-I (Three Principles of the People),
Our aim shall be:
To found a free land,
World peace, be our stand.
Lead on, comrades,
Vanguards ye are.
Hold fast your aim,
By sun and star.
Be earnest and brave,
Your country to save,
One heart, one soul,
One mind, one goal...103

Similarly, during the Long March (1934-1935), the Communist Party and People's
Liberation Army used song, drama, and dance to appeal to the rural peasant population.104 In
1929, Mao Zedong called for the formal inclusion of revolutionary songs in soldiers’ training
programs, and a committee was established to “produce appropriate songs”.105 The Lu Xun Arts
Academy established in 1938, in particular, focused on revising local folk music with new
ideological content, and organized musical companies of all types to popularize this new type of
Communist music.106
However, Mao not only emphasized music as a means for revolution, but also took great
importance in defining the characteristics and purpose of “revolutionary music”.107 At the 1942
Yan’an Forum, held at the city of Yan’an in Communist-controlled China, Mao dedicated an
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entire segment to describing the role of literature and art in the country.108 Specifically, Mao’s
intent was to “ensure that literature and art fit well into the whole revolutionary machine as a
component part, that they operate as powerful weapons for uniting and educating the people and
for attacking and destroying the enemy, and that they help the people fight the enemy with one
heart and one mind”.109 Because of its long-lasting influence on Chinese music, the following
section will explore the Yan’an Forum in detail.

The Yan’an Forum on Literature and Art
From the beginning, Mao recognized the importance of the arts in promoting
revolution.110 He stated, “Writers and artists… produce works which awaken the masses, fire
them with enthusiasm and impel them to unite and struggle to transform their environment”.111
Because literature and the arts were important in both instilling a sense of revolution and creating
a sense of unity among revolutionaries, Mao wanted to ensure that they followed the “correct
path of development”.112 From his standpoint, literature and art could only support his goals of
overthrowing the Guomindang and attaining national liberation for China if they: 1) focused on
workers, peasants, and soldiers as their primary audience; and 2) served the advancement of
Marxism.113 In other words, author Liu Jingzhi notes, “literature and art were subordinate to
politics”.114
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Mao’s first decree was that writers and artists should know their audience and understand
the “language of the masses”.115 Because workers, peasants, soldiers and urban petty
bourgeoisie made up the largest section of the population, Mao believed that literature and the
arts should be exclusively tailored to these groups of people.116 He stated:
“Our literature and art are first for the workers, the class that leads the revolution.
Secondly, they are for the peasants, the most numerous and most steadfast of our allies in
the revolution. Thirdly, they are for the armed workers and peasants… which are the
main forces of the revolutionary war. Fourthly, they are for the laboring masses of the
urban petty bourgeoisie and for the petty-bourgeois intellectuals, both of whom are also
our allies in the revolution and capable of long-term co-operation with us”.117
Furthermore, he implored writers and artists to think of ways to educate the people
because much of the population was illiterate.118 He also criticized writers and artists for being
aloof from the masses and urged them to engage in self reflection, stating, “prior to the task of
educating the workers, peasants, and soldiers is the task of learning from them”.119
The second defining characteristic of revolutionary literature and art according to Mao
was the adherence to Marxist principles. Because promoting Marxist ideas required a thorough
understanding of Marxism and society, he stated, “It is right for writers and artists to study
literary and artistic creation, but the science of Marxism-Leninism must be studied by all
revolutionaries, writers and artists not excepted”.120 Specifically, Mao insisted that writers and
artists study the various classes in society, their mutual relations and respective conditions in
order to produce literature and art that is “rich in content and correct in orientation”.121 Although
he was particularly critical of Chinese opera because it was a courtly art form, he encouraged
artists to draw from China's artistic legacy as well as international art forms in order to further
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socialism.122 He stated, “We must take over all the fine things in our literary and artistic
heritage, critically assimilate whatever is beneficial, and use them as examples when we create
works out of the literary and artistic raw materials in the life of the people of our own time and
place”.123
The third issue that Mao addressed was the debate between popularization and raising the
standard of the arts.124 Mao insisted that these two goals were intertwined, and that improving
the quality of the arts was not possible without it appealing to the masses.125 Because the
workers, peasants, and soldiers set the “basis from which to raise”, Mao argued that it was
imperative for artists and writers to first learn from these groups of people before raising the
standard of the arts.126 In Mao’s opinion, improving the arts meant “raising the level of literature
and art in the direction in which the workers, peasants and soldiers are themselves advancing”.127
Additionally, he noted that because these groups of people had not been properly educated and
were engaged in fighting for liberation, the popularization of revolutionary arts was much more
important than raising the standards of the arts.128 Moreover, he added that popularization would
not be a hindrance to the development of the arts, because “the work of popularization…
prepares the necessary conditions for us to raise standards in the future on a much broader
scale”.129
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One immediate change in Chinese music that resulted from the Yan'an Forum was a
growth in the respectability of folk styles.130 In fact, after the Forum, a large-scale campaign was
implemented in the Communist-controlled areas to educate the largely illiterate rural population
in Communist ideology by means of folk tunes set to revolutionary words.131 These altered folk
songs became known as hong’ge, or red songs, for their revolutionary content. One such song
was “Without the Communist Party, There Would Be No New China” (“Meiyou gongchandang
jiu meiyou xin zhongguo”). Written in 1943, its lyrics state:
Without the Communist Party, There Will Be No New China.
Without the Communist Party, There Will Be No New China.
The Communist Party toiled for the nation.
The Communist Party of one mind saved China
It pointed to the road of liberation for the people.
It led China towards the light.
It supported the War of Resistance for more than eight years.
It has improved people's lives.
It built a base behind enemy lines.
It practiced democracy, bringing many advantages.
Without the Communist Party, there will be no new China.
Without the Communist Party, there will be no new China132
Clearly, “Without the Communist Party, There Would Be No New China” reflects the
deeply political sentiments of revolutionary music. In the bigger picture, the idea that literature
and the arts were integral parts of the “revolutionary machine” became even more important after
the foundation of the People’s Republic of China on October 1, 1949.133 It came to be
understood that folk, popular, and revolutionary music were essentially the same genre, and the
only genre of music permitted.134 Additionally, because the Communist Party was more
interested in popularizing music than improving its quality, the development of new musical
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forms in the Communist-controlled areas was stalled, and music did not move beyond the level
of basic school songs for a long period of time.135 However, although Mao’s Talks at Yan’an set
the precedent for government control of the arts, the onset of the Cultural Revolution ensured
that any remaining degree of freedom in the arts was stifled.136
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Music of the 1960s – 1970s
The music from the 1960s to the 1970s was almost entirely influenced by the Cultural
Revolution.137 The Cultural Revolution was a sociopolitical movement that took place from
1966 to 1976, with the goal to purge remnants of capitalist and traditional elements from Chinese
society, and re-impose Maoist thought as the dominant ideology within the Party.138 Many
believe that Mao instigated the Cultural Revolution because he was losing political power, and
his need to regain authority extended beyond politics to all aspects of life, including music.139
During these ten years, all works of literature or art that did not fit in with the political aims or
suit the tastes of Mao and his wife Jiang Qing were repudiated and destroyed.140 Liu states,
“Literature and art shifted from serving the Party to serving Mao and Jiang, and from being a
means for the Party to enforce obedience they became a means for Mao and Jiang to enforce
obedience”.141
One of the most well-known pieces created during the early 1960s was “The East is Red”
(“Dong fang hong”).142 Produced in 1963 to celebrate the 15th anniversary of the People’s
Republic of China, the musical film retells the history of the Chinese Communist Party from its
founding in 1921 to its victory over the Nationalists in 1949.143 It was directed by Wang Ping,
one of the few female music directors during this period, and was an epic song and dance
production, involving over 3,000 workers, students, and peasants.144 The film became a
cornerstone of Mao’s cult of personality, and its title song, also called “The East is Red”, became
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the unofficial national anthem during the Cultural Revolution.145 The song was based on a
northern Shaanxi folk song, but given new words that compared Mao to the sun in the heaven.146
The lyrics state:
The east is red, the sun is rising.
From China comes Mao Zedong.
He strives for the people's happiness,
Hurrah, he is the people's great saviour!
Chairman Mao loves the people,
He is our guide
to building a new China
Hurrah, lead us forward!
The Communist Party is like the sun,
Wherever it shines, it is bright
Wherever the Communist Party is
Hurrah, the people are liberated!147

Today, many people still think of Dong fang hong as one of the most popular and
influential musical productions from the 1960s.148 At the time, it was the model from which
many later revolutionary pieces were composed.149
After the onset of the Cultural Revolution, Mao’s wife, Jiang Qing, gained tremendous
power over the arts.150 In 1966, she convened a Forum of Literature and Art Work in the Armed
Forces.151 At the forum, it was decided that the People’s Liberation Army would play a decisive
role in any socialist cultural revolution, and the re-education of cultural cadres was prioritized.152
Zhou Yang, the cadre in charge of cultural affairs at the time, was forced out of power by Jiang,
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who claimed that his cultural policy was a “black revisionist line”.153 More importantly, the
forum “signaled the end of 17 years of work in literature and art since the founding of the PRC,
and the beginning of Jiang Qing’s ‘revolutionary yangbanxi’”.154
Although Mao banned traditional Peking opera as "feudalistic and bourgeois”, he
recognized its popularity among the people and sought to reform the genre to suit his
revolutionary goals.155 Thus, while traditional styles of singing, music, accompaniments,
costumes and gestures were preserved, Jiang Qing rewrote the plots and dialogue of traditional
operas and added Western symphonic instruments to enhance the dramatic development of the
stories.156 This led to the development of yangbanxi, which were operas and ballets produced
during the Cultural Revolution that told stories from China's revolutionary struggles against
foreign and class enemies.157 During the Cultural Revolution, eight yangbanxi provided the only
source of entertainment for entire population.158 This led to the joke, "Eight hundred million
people watched eight shows" (“Ba yi ren kan ba ge xi”).159
In creating yangbanxi, Mao and the Gang of Four demonstrated their pragmatism through
exploiting all works of art that could work to their advantage and eradicating any which were
damaging or useless to them.160 Along these lines of pragmatism, almost all music during the
Cultural Revolution was vocal music, because Jiang Qing believed that instrumental music was
difficult to utilize as a propaganda tool.161 As such, composers began inserting lyrics into ballets
and symphonies such as “Hongse niangzijun” (“Red detachment of women”) and
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“Shajiabang”.162 Even the Yellow River concerto, the only truly instrumental piece promoted at
the time, had subtitles which exhorted the audience to “Raise high the great red banner of
Marxism, Leninism, and Mao Zedong Thought and advance fearlessly”.163 Sayings of Mao set
to music, known as quotation songs, were also very popular from the start of the Cultural
Revolution in 1966 until 1969.164 These, along with other songs glorifying the Communist Party
and Cultural Revolution, contributed to revolutionary frenzy of the time period and reinforced
Mao’s cult of personality.165
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Music from the 1970s-1990s
In the aftermath of the Cultural Revolution, a strong emphasis was given to redefining the
role and direction of the arts.166 In successive meetings and conferences, cultural leaders
criticized the mistakes of the past and suggested models for musical reconstruction.167 The
necessity for art to be in line with politics was reiterated, but new leaders such as Deng Xiaoping
and Hu Yaobang encouraged music workers to “build on the traditional legacy of the Chinese
civilization” and incorporate foreign elements that would be helpful to the development of
Chinese music.168 The Central Committee also met with music educators and composers to
correct the “unsophisticated singing styles” of the performers during the previous two decades
and eliminated songs that merely promoted slogans from the Cultural Revolution.169 Music
textbooks and anthologies were revised to “reflect the new period”.170 Finally, Mao’s
prioritization of state goals over the arts was repudiated, and the government slowly began to
support raising the quality of the arts.171
One of the defining characteristics of this post-Cultural Revolution period was the ability
for composers to express their individuality.172 In what Liu calls the “New Wave” period, the
ability for free creation and self-expression was monumental, because individuality was
consistently criticized and punished from the 1940s to the 1970s.173 However, although
composers embraced freedom of expression and Western influences in their music, many were
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still influenced by Mao’s legacy.174 In fact, setting Mao’s poems to music was a popular activity
even after the Cultural Revolution, and many works from notable composers such as Zheng
Lücheng, and Tian Feng were inspired by Mao’s words.175
It was not until the announcement of Deng Xiaoping’s Open Door Policy in 1978 that
China’s popular music began to develop in a direction free from politics and cater to a younger
generation.176 As a result of Deng’s Open Door Policy, the economy grew at an average annual
rate of 10.5 percent from 1979 to 1994, and many coastal cities such as Guangzhou and Shanghai
underwent rapid development.177 This economic growth transformed the music industry,
because young people in the cities could now afford to buy recording and pay for concerts.178
The import of foreign technology and the consequent availability of modern domestic and
personal media appliances such as radios, cassette players, and television sets also accelerated
the development of popular music.179
In addition to foreign genres, young people became enamored by popular music from
Hong Kong and Taiwan, known as Gangtaiyue.180 Gangtaiyue had smooth flowing melodies
that were neither fully Chinese nor fully Western, and a light disco dance rhythm with highpitched vocals reminiscent of Chinese folk song styles.181 Because music in Hong Kong and
Taiwan was not as strictly controlled by their respective governments, composers were able to
write with much more freedom.182 Liu asserts, “In Taiwan and Hong Kong, the environment for
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both music creation and research has been freer than in Mainland China”.183 Thus, composers
were able to write music dealing with taboo subjects such as love, which allowed Gangtaiyue to
become immensely popular among the younger generations. Singers like Deng Lijun (also
known as Teresa Teng) also stimulated the growth of an underground popular music scene in
China.184
Not surprisingly, Gangtaiyue was criticized for being too Westernized, and the
government was wary about Gangtaiyue’s role in the new youth culture.185 Additionally,
although most popular songs during the 1980s were nationalistic in nature, they did not
necessarily support the government.186 For example, Hou Dejian’s “The Descendants of the
Dragon” (“Long De Chuanren”) was an iconic song during this period of time, and it became
one of the anthems for the student protests on Tiananmen in 1989.187 Its lyrics state:
In the Far East there is a river, its name is the Yangtze River
In the Far East there is a river, its name is the Yellow River
In the Ancient East there is a dragon, her name is China
In the Ancient East there is a people, they are all the heirs of the dragon
I grew up under the claw of the dragon, after I grew up I became an heir of the dragon
Black eyes, black hair, yellow skin, forever and ever an heir of the dragon
In the Far East there is a river, its name is the Yangtze River
In the Far East there is a river, its name is the Yellow River
Although I’ve never seen the beauty of the Yangtze, in my dreams I miraculously travel
the Yangtze’s waters
Although I’ve never heard the strength of the Yellow River, the rushing and surging
waters are in my dreams
A quiet night a hundred years ago, the deep dark night before a revolution
The sound of guns and cannons broke the silent night; surrounded on all sides by the
appeasers’ swords
How many years do the cannons ring out, how many years and how many more
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Great dragon, great dragon, rub your eyes and awaken; rub your eyes and awaken
forever188
It is clear that the racial nationalism promoted in the song through lines such as “Black
eyes, black hair, yellow skin, forever and ever an heir of the dragon” is different from the state
nationalism promoted by revolutionary songs. Therefore, although the CCP did not ban these
songs from mainstream media, it did not support them either.189
Another genre of nationalistic pop music that became quite influential in the mid-1980s is
Xibeifeng.190 Xibeifeng adapted folk song melodies from the northwestern part of China to pop
accompaniment developed in Hong Kong and Taiwan.191 These folk songs used a Western-style
fast tempo, strong beat, and forceful bass lines, but also included Chinese traditional
instruments.192 In contrast to Canto-pop, Xibeifeng songs were sung loudly and forcefully, and
this rough vocal style gained popularity because of its folk roots.193 In fact, the rise of Xibeifeng
was aided by the Xungen (seeking roots) movement that began in the late 1980s. This cultural
and literary movement in mainland China celebrated local and minority cultures, and strived to
preserve the Chinese identity against the flood of foreign cultural influence.194
However, although Xibeifeng songs’ revolved around nationalistic content, such as the
Long March and scenes from the countryside, this genre also gave rise to Chinese rock and roll,
or yaogun yinyue, which became a means of protest against the government.195 For example, Cui
Jian, considered the father of Chinese rock and roll and a leading figure in the Xibeifeng genre,
was often banned by the government because his music and political lyrics were thought to
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present a bad example to young people.196 His song, “Nothing to My Name”, tells the story of a
poor boy pleading with his girlfriend to accept his love though he has nothing, but also
symbolizes the feelings of disillusionment and dispossession that were present among the
younger generations at the time. Its lyrics state:
I have asked endlessly,
when will you go with me?
But you always laugh at me, for having nothing to my name.
I want to give you my dreams [goals],
and my freedom,
but you always laugh at me, for having nothing.
Oh! When will you go with me?
Oh! When will you go with me?
The ground beneath my feet is moving,
the water by my side is flowing,
but you always laugh at me, for having nothing.
Why is your laughter never enough?
[Why does your laughter never end?]
Why do I always have to chase you?
Could it be that in front of you
I forever have nothing to my name.
Oh! When will you go with me?
Oh! When will you go with me?
I tell you I’ve waited a long time,
I give you my final request,
I want to take your hands,
and then you’ll go with me.
This time your hands are trembling,
this time your tears are flowing.
Could it be that you’re telling me,
you love me with nothing to my name?
Oh! Now you will go with me!197
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Because of its double-meaning, “I Have Nothing” became another student anthem at the
time of the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests.198 Although the rock music was briefly banned
after the protests, rock and roll continued to function as a means for the younger generation to
express their discontent towards government repression. Jones states, “with their “disturbing”
hairstyles and costumes such as long hair, torn up jeans, gothic style silver metal ornaments and
black leather jackets, rock artists represented a non-conformist attitude and were welcomed by
the youth who wanted a change from the uniform and state-controlled culture.199 Thus, the
popularity of rock groups continued to increase during the late 1980s, and by the 1990s, there
were three rock bands with large followings: Huxi (Breathing), Cobra, and Zang Tianshuo. 200
The true demise of Chinese rock was spurred by economic reasons.201 In 1992, Deng
Xiaoping made his Southern Tour to Shenzhen and other cities to defend his Open Door
Policy.202 As the economy once again embraced market-based reforms, the music industry
became increasingly commercialized.203 Canto-pop and other forms of popular music that had a
wider public appeal and fewer government restrictions became more attractive investments to
record companies than rock music.204 Thus, Canto-pop regained its popularity while rock music
quickly became isolated from mainstream popular culture.205 This downfall of rock music caused
some rock artists such as Tian Zhen and Xu Wei to adopt the Canto-pop style and achieve
commercial success, to the disappointment of other artists like He Yong, who desired to keep the
integrity and spirit of Chinese rock.206
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During the 1990s, it seemed as if the government was losing control of the growing
popularity of western popular music styles.207 For example, many foreign artists held concerts in
China for the first time and international music festivals, such as the Beijing Jazz Festival, were
inaugurated.208 In addition, foreign record companies began to expand into Chinese markets in
the 1990s, and many popular singers such as Na Ying and Liu Huan signed contracts with
companies such as EMI and Sony.209 Thus, the government began to think of ways to counter
the internationalism of popular music in China by reinforcing its nationalistic policies. In 1994,
the CCP Propaganda Department issued the “Fundamental Principles on Implementing a
Patriotic Education”, which endorsed traditional Chinese customs and Confucian values.210 The
Patriotic Education Campaign also renewed emphasis on patriotic songs as a means to unite
China’s people under the concept of “one China”.211 As a result, revolutionary songs, or
hong’ge, from before 1949 were revised and popularized in the 1990s.212 Classic Maoist
revolutionary songs were reworked with R&B and reggae rhythms, and “The East is Red” was
even rewritten with disco beats.213 Although this new style of hong’ge never achieved the same
popularity as Canto-pop or rock, they nonetheless were successful in reviving revolutionary
songs that been marginalized by the Westernization of popular music.214
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CHAPTER 3
Exploring Traditional and Contemporary Min’ge

Although min’ge translates directly as “folk songs”, the term itself does not represent the
entire spectrum of folk songs in China. In both music research and education, traditional min’ge
is usually separated into two categories: shaoshu minzu min’ge (ethnic minority folk songs), and
hanzu min’ge (Han folk songs).215 However, these distinctions are semantically problematic –
besides ethnic differences, there are many layers of regional and stylistic differences that are not
reflected in these broad categories.216 Additionally, I argue that due to the commercialization
and modernization of traditional music, as well as the impact of certain government policies, a
third category of contemporary min’ge has emerged. More importantly, the creation,
performance, and popularization of contemporary min’ge reflects the cultural hegemony of the
Chinese Communist Party and Han majority. This cultural hegemony, derived from the ability to
manipulate cultural products, leads to issues of representation and national identity which will be
explored in the next chapter.
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Traditional Folk Music
Definitions
First, before comparing traditional and contemporary min’ge styles, it is important to
define the scope of “folk music” in this analysis and discuss its unifying characteristics. While it
is agreed upon that folk music originates from the masses, scholars often debate the degree to
which folk music can be changed without losing its traditional identity.217 For example, Rachel
Harris defines traditional folk music as “unwritten oral traditions”, but also acknowledges that
the genre of folk music has changed significantly since the importation of musical notation and
recording devices.218 Additionally, Baranovitch highlights that there have been even greater
changes as a result of the commodification of folk songs.219 However, while both Harris and
Baranovitch view these changes as threatening to the traditional value of folk music, Mackerras
regards these changes as natural. He asserts, “Folk songs, like other performing art forms, are a
developing tradition and consequently subject to change”.220
While acknowledging the inevitable changes in music composition, I will define
traditional folk music as songs free of political influence, originating from and created for the
people of which the music is supposed to represent. Although the categories of “traditional” and
“contemporary” imply temporal distinctions, it is impossible to assign a given time period to
each category, because traditional folk music can still be composed today.221 Thus, “traditional”
is more synonymous with “original”, and “contemporary” can be thought of as deviating from
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the original form. However, it is important to note that many songs of the min’ge style
composed after 1942 will not be considered traditional min’ge for the purposes of this analysis. I
highlight 1942 as the pivotal year for folk music, because, as mentioned in Chapter 2, the Yan’an
Talks inspired many changes – one of which included the assignment of composers to the
countryside to learn about folk melodies and rewrite folk songs with revolutionary lyrics. In
addition, after the Yan’an Talks, revolutionary music, or hong’ge, became the only acceptable
form of music, causing many genres of music, including folk music and Western classical styles,
to be assimilated into this category.222

Unique Characteristics
In traditional min’ge, there are many layers of diversity. For example, although the label
of “Han” implies a unity of folk customs, Han folk songs can be separated into eleven different
“culture areas”: the Northeastern Plain, Northwestern Plain, Jing Huai Plateau (northern Jiangsu
and northern Anhui), Jiang Zhe Plain (south Jiangsu), southern Anhui, Zhejiang, Min Tai (Fujian
and Taiwan), Yue (Guangdong), Jiang Han Plain (Hubei, southern Henan), Xiang (Hunan), Gan
(Jiangxi), Southwestern Plateau, and Kejia (Hakka people of various places). These “culture
areas” differ in not only their geographic locations, but also their customs, dialects, and musical
traditions.223
The diversity of the shaoshu minzu min’ge is even greater. Even though it is well known
that each of the 55 minorities preserves its own characteristic local music, there are many types
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of folk songs not accounted for.224 In fact, Chinese musicologists often divide the folk songs of
each minority into several categories.225 For example, there are nine representative types of
Mongolian folk songs that are often divided into the broader categories “long songs” (chang
diao) and “short songs” (duan diao), depending on their function, tempo, lyrical content, and
accompanying instruments.226
Besides the divisions within Han min’ge and ethnic minority min’ge, there are differences
between the two categories in terms of instrumentation, tonality, vocal styles, and tempo. For
example, Mongolian folk songs are often accompanied by the horse-head fiddle, yoochin, and
Khuuchir, whereas Han folk songs usually feature the suona, chuigushou and the luo (commonly
known as a gong).227 The singing styles of each minority are also very different. Uyghur folk
songs, for instance, have many ornamentations in the melodic line, whereas Han folk songs, such
as mountain songs (shan’ge), have much more straightforward melodies.228 The tempo of
traditional folk songs also varies significantly – whereas some are not metered, like the “long
songs” of Mongolian origin, others, like the Uyghur sanam, feature percussive instruments that
play complex rhythms.229 Traditional folk songs also have unique tonality – for example,
Mongolian throat singing, or Khoomei, is a type of overtone singing, where the performer
produces a fundamental pitch and simultaneously adds one or more pitches over the first pitch.230
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Preservation and Influence
Unfortunately, the preservation of these songs has been difficult. Folk music, along with
many other types of music mentioned in Chapter 2, suffered many negative consequences from
the Cultural Revolution. For instance, the singing of folk songs was forbidden and many
talented singers were persecuted.231 Those who collected folk music were also under attack
because folk songs were considered traditional elements of society to be eradicated.232 Today,
many of the elderly who would potentially be capable of passing on these folk song traditions,
are too traumatized from the Cultural Revolution to sing.233 Schimmelpenninck states, “In the
Wu area234, many people are still afraid because of their past experiences and do not want to sing
any more, certainly not in front of a microphone”.235
Furthermore, the attitude towards folk music has changed, with both the younger and
older generations considering folk songs to be obsolete in the dynamically modernizing world.236
Young people who develop a professional interest in singing usually become students at urban
conservatories or art schools, where an operatic and polished style of singing is taught, which has
little in common with traditional rural performance styles.237 Many of the elderly also seem to
have internalized the idea that traditional customs are no longer relevant, or even welcome, in the
modern era.238 When elderly Wu singers were asked why they no longer perform their songs in
the fields, they remarked, “We cannot do that. People would laugh at us; they would think us
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mad”.239 This is a stark contrast from the prevalence of folk song singing before the Cultural
Revolution, when singing folk songs were considered a part of daily life and a very important
tradition of the villages.240

These difficulties in the preservation of traditional min’ge and its declining influence has
set the pretext for the emergence of contemporary min’ge. Additionally, the diversity of
traditional min’ge explored in this section will be contrasted to the homogenization of
contemporary min’ge highlighted in the next section.
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Contemporary Min’ge
Development and Politicization before the Cultural Revolution
In the beginning, contemporary min’ge was not political. The first song to have
Mandarin lyrics set to traditional minority folk music was “Dabancheng Girl” (“Dabancheng de
guniang”), written in 1938 by Wang Luobin, a Han composer who gained a tremendous amount
of fame for composing songs with in a Uyghur style.241 The lyrics, which are in Mandarin,
describe the beauty of girls from Dabancheng, a city in the Xinjiang province. The lyrics are as
follows:
Dabancheng girls have long plaits and two eyes so pretty.
If you get married, don’t marry anyone else, you must marry me
Bring along your wealth, and your little sister, come along on your horse-drawn cart!242
Now considered a quintessential Uyghur folk song in many folk song anthologies in
China, the song was most likely inspired by the Turkic carters who passed through Lanzhou,
where Wang settled during the Second Sino-Japanese War.243 According to Harris,
“Dabancheng Girl” was very popular among Chinese audiences in Lanzhou, where it was
performed by Wang’s theater troupe, but there is no evidence that it became popular in other
areas of China at that time.244 In fact, it is highly unlikely, due to the fact that Wang’s troupe
performed only locally.245
However, even though Wang’s music did not have a tremendous following at the time,
his idea of writing Mandarin lyrics for traditional minority min’ge was echoed by many
composers during the 1940s. As Mao’s Talks at Yan’an were internalized and many composers
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were sent to the countryside to “learn from the people”, a large amount of contemporary min’ge
was created.246
Unlike Wang’s initial songs, however, these new min’ge were explicitly political. In fact,
the only defining characteristic between these min’ge and other revolutionary types of music
such as hong’ge was their use of minority folk tunes.247 For example, the song “The Sun in the
Grassland Rises Never to Go Down” (“Caoyuan shang shengqi bu luo de taiyang”), written in
1952 by Meili Qige, is often referred to as a “Mongolian folk song” due to its melodic lines, slow
tempo and free rhythm that are characteristic of traditional Mongolian folk music.248 However,
although Meili Qige was ethnically Mongolian, he wrote this piece in Mandarin for his students
at Central Conservatory of Music in Beijing, and its main purpose is to extol Chairman Mao.249
The lyrics state:
White clouds float in the blue sky, under the white clouds horses gallop
Waving whip sounds all around, a hundred birds hover together.
If people ask me what place is that
I proudly tell them: this is our home.
People here love peace, and have deep love for their native land
They sing about their new lives, they sing about the Communist Party.
Chairman Mao, ah! The Communist Party! They are bringing us up to maturity
The sun in the grassland rises never to go down…250
This reflects the policy of “coming from the masses and going back to the masses” that
was the basis of the creation of contemporary min’ge during the 1940s and 1960s.251 This massline policy, in the context of music, essentially describes the process of taking melodic material
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(folk melodies, tempos, singing styles, etc.) from the people, then giving it back to them in a new
form that is “coordinated and systematized after careful study”.252 However, folk music was not
only to be arranged and harmonized by professionally-trained musicians, but also sanitized in
this process. Hamm states, “Not incidentally, in the process it [folk music] was purged of
ideologically incorrect associations – folk music’s connection with the “superstitions” of
religious and pagan ritual, and Chinese classical music’s historical association with the
privileged classes – and was offered in a new, ideologically correct environment”.253 This new
type of min’ge was then popularized through performances by state ensembles, and publicized
and praised by the state press to “encourage the masses to embrace this music as their own”.254

Development after the Cultural Revolution
While the trend of setting folk songs to revolutionary lyrics in Mandarin persisted
throughout the 1940s to the 1960s, all remnants of folk culture were harshly banned by the
government during the Cultural Revolution.255 However, after the Cultural Revolution, folk
songs were slowly recovered and the content of contemporary min’ge began to shift away from
the glorifying Mao.256 Instead, minority folk songs focusing on pastoral life, love, and women
became extremely popular.257
In 1982, the Minister of Culture, Huang Zhen, made a speech in the closing of the AllChina Minority Nationalities Performing Arts Festival that became the official source for policy
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toward the performing arts of minority groups.258 His speech can be summarized into these five
essential points:259
1. The cultural cadres, folk, and other artists of the minority nationality performing arts
who were suppressed by the gang of four should be reinstated.
2. The minority nationalities should enjoy “full autonomy and power of initiative” in
their performing arts, and “be the real masters in their own house of culture”.
3. While variety in the arts should be encouraged, Party policy should be applied in all
areas, with literature and arts being no exception.
4. Cadres should work to build the cultural enterprises of the minority nationality areas
and make sure remote areas are not left out.
5. All performing arts work must aim to promote unity among the nationalities,
including that among Han and minority workers in the performing arts, as well as that
among the various minority nationalities themselves.
Although these points seem to suggest a rather open policy towards minority arts, there
are many contradictions which ultimately reinforce the cultural authority of the Party. For
example, while Huang encouraged minorities to be “the masters in their own house of culture”,
he reinforces the fact that all literature and art is still subject to Party policy. Furthermore,
Huang’s instructions to “promote unity among the nationalities” are less heavy-handed than
Mao’s requirement that all literature and art be “revolutionary”, but minority arts are still
mandated to serve Party goals, which clearly limits their agency.
While contemporary minority min’ge composed today avoids explicit glorification of the
Party, they are not entirely apolitical.260 In fact, many contemporary folk songs that borrow
ethnic min’ge styles have lyrics that carry implicit political messages.261 One example is the
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song “Road to Heaven”, released in 2005 by half-Tibetan singer Han Hong.262 The song’s music
video features video clips from the construction of the Beijing-Lhasa express train, and expresses
the singer’s anticipation of the railroad reaching her hometown.263 The lyrics state:
At dawn I stand in the fresh green meadow
And find a sacred eagle carrying the morning rays on its wings
Like an auspicious cloud flying across the sky
To bring good fortune to the Tibetan peoples
At dusk I stand high up on the hill
To watch that railroad be built to my hometown
Like dragons crossing the mountains one after another
To bring welfare to the snow-capped plateau
That’s a heavenly road of wonder ahh...
To carry the warmth of the world to the border area
Making mountains and roads no longer inaccessible
And bringing the peoples together through laughter264

Even though the song never directly mentions the CCP, the song glorifies one of the
CCP’s projects, and thus indirectly praises the government’s policies. Furthermore, in several
lines of the song, the Beijing-Lhasa express train is portrayed as the savior of the Tibetan people.
For example, the comparison between the train and “an auspicious cloud flying across the sky to
bring good fortune to the Tibetan peoples”, and the reference to the train as “a heavenly road of
wonder”, all serve to reinforce the image of gratitude from the Tibetan people towards the
government.265
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Commercialization and Modernization
As explored in Chapter 2, economic growth during the 1980s transformed the music
industry, and the commodification of music accelerated the development of popular music, as
well as contemporary minority min’ge.266 Minority min’ge now had to compete with Gangtaiyue,
and many composers exploited the “exotic” qualities of traditional minority folk music as
economic capital.267 In fact, in a response to the flood of foreign influence after the Open Door
Policy of 1978, many people were drawn to minority min’ge because it retained the authenticity
that genres such as Gangtaiyue seemed to lack.268 Like the Xibeifeng songs of the mid-1980s,
minority min’ge became even more popular during the Xungen movement because it represented
a type of music that celebrated its cultural roots.269
However, contemporary minority min’ge was also greatly influenced by the genres of
pop and rock that became popular during the 1980s.270 For example, the song “I Want to Go to
Tibet” (“Wo Xiang Qu Xizang”) that was popularized by Wulan Tuoya, a Mongolian min’ge
singer, is an interesting crossover between min’ge and pop.271 Although the style of singing
features a nasal tone and guttural ornamentations that are typical of traditional Tibetan and
Mongolian folk songs, the song has an upbeat pop rhythm that reflects the importation of an
entirely Western concept.272 The incorporation of this rhythm became commonplace among
many minority themed songs during the early 2000s.273 In fact, the only elements of these new
min’ge pop songs that allude traditional minority folk music is the use of certain traditional
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singing techniques and lyrics emphasizing the allure of China’s periphery regions.274 In this
particular song, the lyrics describe the singer’s admiration and longing for Tibet:
Buddha's halo breaks endless bleakness,
A chant sounds rejoicing and soothing.
Early morning, I lift my wings of clouds
Late in the evening, I crawl towards your Heaven.
New life flows along the Yarlung Zangbo River,
Memory stretches long in the Potala Palace
The grand grassland is opening its arms
To welcome me, a gentle sheep.
I want to go to Tibet.
I want to go to Tibet!
To worship its grand snowy land,
Beautiful scenery and lush green grass.
The pasture in my heart is everywhere!
I want to go to Tibet.
I want to go to Tibet!
To worship Samsara and Nirvana.
In loneliness and long dark night,
A Snow Lotus blossoms in my heart!275

Parallel to the influence of pop and rock, Western classical styles also became
commonplace in the composition of contemporary min’ge.276 Today, professional and amateur
musicians alike will associate the term “min’ge” to a style that is a hybrid between traditional
Han min’ge and Western classical styles.277 This style of min’ge belongs to a genre of music that
Hamm refers to as “light music”, or what Liu categorizes as “New Music”.278 In Hamm’s
analysis, light music encompasses “instrumental arrangements of Chinese traditional melodies,
new pieces by Chinese composers based on similar melodic material, folk songs arranged for
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voices with instrumental accompaniment, and recent vocal compositions drawing on elements of
traditional Chinese style”.279 Although this music possesses traditional “Chinese” qualities, the
melody is based on a pentatonic scale, and the songs usually feature a string-dominated ensemble
including both Chinese and Western instruments.280
Thus, this style is often seen as not entirely Chinese or Western. One of the most
“Chinese” elements of this type of min’ge, in fact, is its connection to hong’ge.281 Like the
revolutionary songs developed in the 1920s and 1930s, many songs are fervently nationalistic
and exult loyalty to the state.282 In “My Motherland”, for example, the chorus states:
I love my country, I kiss my country,
Kiss you with my warmest part of my heart,
I love my motherland, I kiss my motherland,
Loving you is my life’s sustenance283
However, although these songs have origins from the early revolutionary songs, they are
noticeably more sophisticated and complex.284 For example, most of these songs include both
Western orchestras and traditional Chinese instruments as accompaniment, and feature Westerninfluenced forms and harmonies, tempered tuning, virtuosic effects, fixed rhythmic
interpretations, and melodic ornaments.285 The style of singing is also very refined – it features
the nasal tone of traditional Han folk songs, but incorporates Western operatic techniques and
tonality to create a fuller sound.286
On the one hand, this reflects the greater importance placed on raising the quality of the
arts after the Cultural Revolution, as explored in Chapter 2. The adaptation of Western models
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of harmony, intonation, and instrumentation can also be seen as attempt to “modernize” Chinese
music, because Western music was seen as more modern and scientific than traditional Chinese
music.287 Hamm notes, however, that this development was not unique, but followed a Soviet
model.288 Chinese conservatories of music were reshaped in the 1950s according to the Russian
system, and the Soviet model of large “folk” ensembles playing arrangements created by
professional composers of traditional tunes became the example for many contemporary Han
min’ge ensembles today.289 Nonetheless, this new “national music culture”, with contemporary
Han min’ge as a center point, became essentially, “Chinese folk melodies + western professional
techniques”.290
On the other hand, the Westernization of min’ge may reflect the practical demands of the
state. The revolutionary songs of the 1920s and 1930s fell into disfavor among much of the
Chinese population after 1978 because of their association with attitudes prevalent during the
Cultural Revolution, and since then, the government has attempted to “repackage” these songs in
order to maintain their appeal.291 The growing openness to foreign culture after the Open Door
Policy also gave the Chinese population a chance to choose from among a much wider range of
musical styles.292 Therefore, it is clear that contemporary min’ge is a practical adaptation of
hong’ge, because the older genre is no longer capable of rousing and maintaining mass
enthusiasm for the state.293
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Societal Changes
Besides the three trends in music mentioned thus far (modernization, commercialization,
and politicization), there were also several societal changes that affected the min’ge genre
significantly. First, the professionalization of the performing artists drastically changed the
development of minority folk music.294 Although minority artists were employed by
professional companies since the Communist Party came to power, the emphasis on minority
recruitment after 1975 contributed to significantly greater Han control over minority music. 295
Yang Mu notes that Zhou Enlai encouraged the Central Nationalities Song and Dance Troupe to
have 50 percent representation from minority artists, but by 1984, the percentage had already
reached 57 percent.296 Mackerras adds, “by its enthusiastic sponsorship of the mass arts of the
minority nationalities, the CCP has been willing and able to control the type of arts revived and
performed, to choose the artists, and to ensure the ideological suitability of anything that appears
on stage”.297
However, while some would argue that this Han influence is threatening the preservation
of traditional minority folk music, Mackerras points out that artists who are recruited into staterun professional troupes are given many benefits that are often denied to other performing artists,
such as access to social services and a stable salary.298 Thus, Mackerras asserts that these artists
are better off in professional troupes than they were before, when the state did not sponsor
minority arts.299 Nevertheless, this method is suggestive of a carrot-and-stick approach – by
controlling access to these benefits, the government is able to retain its control over yet another
aspect of popular culture.
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Furthermore, the education of minority artists in a system of training that is of Han origin
denies any opportunity for these artists to break away from Han influence. In discussing the new
dynamics of professionalism in music, Baranovich states, “Minority artists and intellectuals were
trained in Han-dominated official institutions, acquiring politically correct knowledge about their
ethnic identity and learning how to represent it artistically in politically accepted venues”. 300
Thus, the revival of minority folk music and accelerated recruitment of minority artists may have
created the image of diversity that Huang intended when he encouraged minorities to be “the real
masters in their own house of culture” – however, whether or not these trends have benefited the
development of traditional minority music is extremely questionable.
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Discussion
Cultural Hegemony of the CCP
The development of contemporary min’ge has essentially redefined the understanding of
folk music as grassroots, oral musical traditions that have been passed down through generations.
As mentioned earlier, the changes in this definition of folk music have been influenced by the
commercialization and modernization of music, certain government policies, and societal
changes in terms of the professionalization and education of musicians. However, although each
of these factors have contributed to the development of contemporary min’ge in different ways, it
is important to recognize that all of these processes assert the cultural hegemony of the CCP,
where cultural hegemony is defined as the ability to control cultural production and assign
cultural significance.
First, the policy of “coming from the masses and going back to the masses” clearly
outlined the intention of the government to gain control over all types of popular music,
including folk music. By determining developing and refining certain elements of traditional
folk songs, but eliminating others, such as any pagan and religious significance, the CCP
transformed the composition of folk music and accelerated the development of contemporary
min’ge – a style of music which Wang Luobin first introduced. Additionally, the government’s
rigorous efforts to popularize this type of music and inspire people to “embrace it as their own”
reveals the CCP’s supervision over not only the production of min’ge, but also its influence.
Although Huang Zhen’s 1982 speech appears to be less dictatorial than Mao’s talks at
Yan’an, in reality, it reiterated the tremendous amount of control the government maintained
over minority arts. In the end, minority music was still subject to the policies of the Party and
functioned to serve the Party’s goals. While “serving the Party” no longer requires the explicit
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glorification of the CPP, songs like “Road to Heaven” are reminders that contemporary min’ge
can function as government propaganda in multiple ways, including by celebrating its actions or
projects.
Similarly, though the commercialization of music suggests that the development of
contemporary min’ge was not solely influenced by the government but also by economic forces,
the modernization of min’ge tells an entirely different story. While the modernization, or
Westernization, of music is not unique to the genre of min’ge, the one of the main purposes
behind the incorporation of Western musical elements was to revive old revolutionary songs. In
this way, the modernization of min’ge reflects the government’s strategy of repackaging
revolutionary hong’ge to be more palatable for the contemporary audience.
Finally, the education and professionalization of musicians has given the government a
tremendous amount of control in terms of the creation and performance of min’ge. Although
there are important economic benefits to the professionalization of musicians, the government’s
complete authority over the selection and training of minority individuals to state professional
troupes effectively stymies any potential agency minorities have in terms of overturning the
cultural hegemony of the CCP from within these Han-dominated institutions.
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CHAPTER 4
Issues of Representation and National Identity

Cultural hegemony, defined as the complete authority over cultural production and
significance, is not necessarily a novel concept. In fact, the cultural hegemony of the CCP and
the Han majority has been explored by both political scientists and anthropologists, and has led
to related concepts such as “internal Orientalism”, which focuses on the exoticization of
minorities.301 Beyond highlighting the privileged and dominant role the Chinese state has in
constructing and representing ethnic identities, however, this chapter will also explore the
significance of cultural hegemony in the context of different theories of nationalism, and its
implications on Han-minority relations.
At the first level of analysis, there are, essentially, two identities created by min’ge. One
is the representation of minorities as primitive and exotic, and the other is the representation of
the Han as Westernized and advanced.302 The two representations work simultaneously to
reinforce the idea of the Han as the enlightened leaders, similar to the “benevolent dictators” of
China.303 A more in-depth analysis of min’ge’s role in Chinese nationalism presents the
following contradiction: the same voice of the minorities that is popularized through min’ge
functions to stifle their political voice. There have, however, been exceptions, and these will be
explored in the final section of this chapter.
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The Dynamics of “Otherness”
The issues of representation associated with the cultural hegemony of the CCP are
particularly important to examine within min’ge due to the subliminal nature of its messages.304
At a first glance, it is difficult to distinguish anything negative about the depiction of minorities.
In fact, the tunes and lyrics are extremely appealing because they depict such picturesque scenes.
“The Beautiful Grassland is My Home” (“Meili de caoyuan shi wode jia”), for example, became
one of the most well-known “Mongolian” folk songs due to its alluring representation of the
pastoral lifestyle of the Mongolian people.305 The lyrics idealize life in the countryside:
The beautiful grassland is my home,
The wind blows through the green grass
and there are flowers everywhere
Colored butterflies are flying
and hundred birds are singing，
The glow of the sunset is reflected in the blue water
The coursers are just like the beautiful clouds,
Flocks and herds are just like the pearls on the grassland.
Ah ... ah ... he...
Shepherd girls are singing openly,
their delightful voices fill the skyline.
The beautiful grassland is my home,
I love its clear water and beautiful grassland.
The grassland is just like the green sea,
and the yurts are just like white lotus flowers.
The herdsmen depict a happy landscape,
and the beautiful spring scenery is just like a picture
that extends ten thousand miles...
Ah ... ah ... he...
Shepherd girls are singing openly，
their delightful voices fill the skyline.306
Although the song does not have any malevolent intentions in its portrayal of the
Mongolian people, it clearly does not reflect reality. Firstly, it is important to note that despite
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the songs reference to “shepherd girls”, there are few, if any, shepherds who are women.307
Secondly, the pastoral lifestyle depicted in the song is not representative of the lifestyle followed
by most ethnic Mongolians in China today. Baranovich states, “Most Chinese and non-Chinese
alike would probably be surprised to learn that of the 2,489,780 Mongols who inhabited Inner
Mongolia in 1982, only 18% were pastoral nomads; most of the rest were agriculturalists”.308
The percentage is even smaller today, with the government actively pursuing nomad resettlement
policies.309 Intended to restore the grasslands in Inner Mongolia, the initiatives provide subsidies
to herdsmen for selling off their flocks and moving to towns or cities.310
Furthermore, while the song portrays the Mongolians as a peaceful and content minority,
there has been a history of conflict between the Han and the Mongolians since the Qing
Dynasty.311 Ethnic issues are even more tense now, due to the ever-increasing levels of Han
migration to the area – only 20 percent of the population in Inner Mongolia today is ethnically
Mongolian.312 In fact, in 2011, protests erupted after a Mongolian herdsman was struck and
killed by a Han coal truck driver, which resulted in many students, professors and herders being
taken into custody.313 Although the truck driver was eventually convicted and given a death
sentence, the protests reflected the underlying enmity tied to longstanding grievances about the
ecological destruction from the mining boom, the perception that economic growth
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disproportionately benefits the Han, and the rapid disappearance of Inner Mongolia’s pastoral
tradition.314
However, outside of Inner Mongolia, these issues are little known.315 After the 2011
protests, the government worked rapidly to restrict Internet access in the area, shut down several
Mongolian news sources, and placed schools in areas with large ethnic Mongol populations on
lockdown.316 The main source of information for foreign news outlets regarding the protests was
the Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center, which the Chinese government
accused of possessing ulterior motives and sensationalizing the incident.317 This lack of
information regarding ethnic conflicts allows for songs such as “The Beautiful Grassland is My
Home” to maintain their popularity despite their strikingly inaccurate portrayals of minorities. 318
On the other hand, the continuing popularity of “The Beautiful Grassland is My Home” also
ensures that this idealized, pastoral image of Inner Mongolia will continue to influence the
perception of the public.319
Thus, these “symbols of minority otherness” within min’ge effectively undermine the
minorities’ abilities to portray their own realities. Baranovitch writes, “through emphasizing the
symbols of minority otherness, the state is trying to conceal or divert attention from activity that
is destroying the reality of that otherness”.320 This is very much related to Huang Zhen’s 1982
speech, where he emphasizes that all performing arts work “must aim to promote unity among
the nationalities, including that among Han and minority workers in the performing arts, as well
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as that among the various minority nationalities themselves”.321 Although this policy might have
been formulated with good intentions, it invariably silences an important aspect of minority
discourse – the reality that unity cannot be achieved without acknowledging the grievances of
minorities. By emphasizing unity and integration, min’ge serves the state’s goals of appearing
committed to multiethnicity, but distorts the reality of the peoples it supposedly represents. This
has caused to authors such Ann Anagnost to assert that “most officially produced minority songs
are more about minorities than of or for them”.322
While min’ge raises many issues of representation, it is important to recognize that the
effect of a particular song on its audience may be unintentional. Baranovich, for example, points
out that the last four lines of “The Sun in the Grassland Rises Never to Go Down” (“Cao yuan
shang sheng qi bu luo de tai yang”), portray the Mongols as needing the guidance of Chairman
Mao.323 They state: “Chairman Mao, ah! The Communist Party! They are bringing us up to
maturity…” (Mao zhuxi ah! gongchandang! fuyu women chengzhang).324 Baranovich then
asserts that this song reflects the Han people’s patronizing attitude towards minorities. However,
this argument is too simplistic because it does not take into consideration the fact that the
composer, Meili Qige, is ethnically Mongolian, and many songs during this era (the 1950s) have
similar messages of Chairman Mao and the Communist Party guiding the people.325 For
example, in “The East is Red” (Dong fang hong), the lyrics refer to Mao as “the people’s great
savior” (Ta shi renmin da jiuxing) and “the one who will lead our way in order to construct a
new China” (Ta shi women dailu ren, weile jianshe xin zhongguo).326 Thus, the lyrics to “The
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Sun in the Grassland Rises Never to Go Down” simply reflect the musical trends of that time
period, and may not have an alternative meaning.
However, regardless of intention, min’ge can reinforce the image of minorities as
primitive and backward, which strengthens Han chauvinism.327 While certain motifs such as the
image of a patronizing Mao are prevalent in both Han minority folk songs and ethnic minority
folk songs, these motifs are given a new significance within min’ge precisely because they
involve the appropriation of minority cultures.328 For example, because the image of the
primitive minorities versus the advanced Han was established since the founding of the PRC, it is
often believed that the Han should assist the minorities on the path to modernization.329 Thus,
songs such as “The Sun in the Grassland Rises Never to Go Down” that portray minorities as
welcoming the assistance of the Han people can appeal to this kind of Han chauvinism, even
though they were not necessarily written with this intent.
Furthermore, the portrayal of minorities as requiring the aid of the government is not
always as explicit as the lines in “The Sun in the Grassland Rises Never to Go Down” calling for
Chairman Mao’s guidance are, but often carry the same problematic representations of minority
peoples. As mentioned in Chapter 3, the song “Road to Heaven” praises the Party by expressing
the gratitude of the Tibetan people for the Beijing-Lhasa railway. Although the railway was a
controversial project that was met with local protests from the Tibetan communities, the song
reinforces the benevolence of the Party and glorifies the railroad as “carrying the warmth of the
world to the border area” and “making mountains and roads no longer inaccessible”.330
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The popularity of “Road to Heaven” also diminishes mainstream knowledge about the
concerns of the Tibetan communities regarding the railway.331 The song, written by Han
composers Yin Qing and Qu Yuan, and performed by half-Tibetan singer Han Hong, gained
significant recognition through being featured on the CCTV Chinese New Year Gala in 2005 and
recently regained its popularity on the “I am a Singer” (Wo shi geshou) singing competition in
2015.332 However, despite the song’s positive portrayal of the railroad, there have been
numerous complaints that the railway’s $4.2 billion price tag is almost triple the amount Beijing
spends in Tibet on health care and education, and concerns that an influx of long-term migrants
will threaten the Tibetans’ cultural integrity.333 With no unified resistance however, the
government has continued to expand the railway line. In August 2014, China opened a $2billion extension of the railway to Shigatse, the traditional seat of Tibetan Buddhism's secondhighest figure, the Panchen Lama.334 According to Reuters, China is also currently planning to
build a second railway line linking Lhasa to the southwestern city of Chengdu, and will
eventually extend the railway to the borders of India, Nepal and Bhutan by 2020.335
In addition to the “primitive” representation of minorities, the focus on the female form is
another aspect within min’ge that reinforces a hierarchy between the Han and the minorities.336
To Han composers, love songs focusing on the female form are common in all types of folk
songs, and therefore considered acceptable, and even highly appealing, material for the creation
of min’ge.337 However, the objectification of the minority female by Han composers inevitably

331

Baranovich 2001.
Yan Zhang. "Tianlu Han Hong Yanchang Gequ (Road to Heaven Song Profile)." Baidu Baike.
333
Carin Zissis. "Chinese Train Carries Controversy." Council on Foreign Relations, 2016.
334
Ben Blanchard. "China Opens $2-billion Extension of Controversial Tibet Railway." Reuters, 2014.
335
Michelle Florcruz. "China-Nepal Railway Through Mount Everest: China Plans To Expand Controversial Tibet
Railway To Nepal." International Business Times, 2015.
336
Anagnost 1997.
337
Ibid.
332

64

recreates the power dynamic between the creator and his creation.338 In ethnic minority music,
this power dynamic takes on another layer of meaning. For example, the song “Dabancheng
Girl”, composed by Wang Luobin, is essentially the translation of a Uyghur folk song called
“Qämbärkhan”.339 Phrases such as “Lift up your veil, let me see your face” and “Don’t marry
anyone else, you must marry me” have basis in the original folk song.340 However, the Mandarin
lyrics have caused a controversy among Uyghur music critics, mainly due to the fact that the
composer is Han.341 Harris notes, “the same objectifying gaze on a woman’s body is perceived
very differently when it is expressed by the Other, in this case the Han Chinese”.342 This may be
due to the fact that similar to how the subordination of women reinforces the elevated position of
men, the objectification of minority women implicitly establishes the dominance of the Han.343
The minority female is also portrayed as more sexual than the Han woman in many
instances.344 For example, the marketing of Uyghur min’ge often utilizes provocative images of
Near Eastern belly dancers, highlighting the commodification of the minority female.345 This
has caused significant resentment from the Uyghur community because, as Gladney notes, “As
Muslims, they [women] are generally much more conservative than Han Chinese in the public
sexual sphere”.346 However, this sexualized representation has continued, highlighting the
insensitivity many composers have towards the cultures from which they derive creative
inspiration.347 Furthermore, this tendency to appropriate the female Other is also common to
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many other forms of art, including fine arts and cinema.348 This trend in the arts hints at its
utility in defining ethnic relations in China. Ultimately, the sexualization of minority women
contributes to the exoticization of minorities, which strengthens the imagined identity of the Han
and reaffirms Han feelings of superiority.349
The emphasis on the “otherness” of minorities has its limits, however. Rachel Harris
notes that in many recording of “Dabancheng Girl”, the unique characteristics of Uyghur folk
songs are “ironed out and replaced with a stereotyped pseudo-exotic sound”.350 She
hypothesizes that this process is similar to the Orientalism present in Western music, in which
Eastern musical forms are stereotyped and used as motifs representing repressed sexuality and
the unknown.351 For example, while Wang Luobin’s songs maintain the stereotypical upbeat
tempo of Uyghur dances, the asymmetric rhythms of many Uyghur songs are replaced with a
regular four-beat, and the complex modality of Uyghur music is adapted to the pentatonic
scale.352
These changes are particularly salient in another one of Wang Luobin’s songs, “Mayila”,
which recently gained another surge of popularity through a Han min’ge singer named Chang
Sisi.353 In the music video, Chang Sisi and her background dancers appear in Uyghur style
costumes that are altered to reveal their midriffs.354 Additionally, she performs “Mayila” with a
smooth, nasalized tone and adds many ornamentations typical of Western coloratura arias. 355
The result is a very culturally muddied production, but it is precisely this dynamic of “exoticwith-limitations” that contributes to its popularity. Harris notes, “That Wang Luobin’s songs are
348
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re-presented in the style of contemporary Chinese popular song but with a stereotyped exotic
twist, as the performers mediate and as it were tame the wildness of the feared Other, is key in
understanding their popularity and selling power”.356
Thus, while contemporary minority min’ge has been celebrated for promoting diversity
and national unity, the limits placed upon “otherness” and authentic representation undermine its
ability to have true cultural significance. As Han composers assert their ability to pick and
choose the most favorable and appealing qualities of traditional minority folk songs, and as these
songs are continually considered “authentic”, the perception of minority peoples will always be
influenced by the stereotypes that these songs perpetuate.
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The Dynamics of Westernization
In Chapter 2, I introduced new forms of popular music that were influenced by the West,
and subsequently in Chapter 3, I explored the Westernization of min’ge in relation to the
commodification and modernization of Chinese music. In Chapter 3, I also introduced another
type of contemporary min’ge influenced by Western classical styles that can be characterized as
a refined and “repackaged” version of hong’ge. In this section, I intend to further detail the
development of this type of min’ge and explore its significance, especially in terms of
maintaining and strengthening the Han identity. The significance is essentially twofold – (1) its
popularization has facilitated the erasure of differences between the Han and created a myth of
shared traditions, and (2) its imitation of Western classical styles contributes to the modern and
advanced image of the Han.
In some ways, Westernized min’ge merely imitates musical forms promoted by
Communist countries. Its two defining characteristics – the manipulation of folk tunes for
glorification of the state and the assimilation of Western classical elements – are very similar to
the folk songs popularized by the Soviet government during the 1990s.357 The homogeny within
this genre has also led scholars such as Liu to sympathize with Mainland composers who are
“muzzled by the Communist Party’s policy on literature and art” and unable to express their
individual styles.358 However, although the cultural hegemony of the CCP may be attributed to
the authoritarian nature of Communist governments, the manipulation of traditions for the
purposes of nationalism has been studied in a variety of contexts, giving rise to the theory of
ethnosymbolism.359
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In the theory of ethnosymbolism, the formation and continuity of national identities is
dependent upon myths, memories, values, traditions, and symbols.360 In line with this theory, it
is important to recognize that the significance of folk culture has been tied to political
preferences since the early 1900s.361 For example, during the May Fourth Movement, there was
a brief revival of interest in folk music because folk traditions represented a departure from
Confucian values and the elitist traditions of the literati.362 Returning to indigenous culture was
viewed as a means to improve society, and thus, Eminov asserts, “folklore journals came to be
filled with the idea of using folklore studies in order to modernize society”.363 However, as
modernization became increasingly synonymous with Westernization after the collapse of the
Qing Dynasty, the study of folk music was cast aside.364 In fact, folk culture came to be
regarded as hazardous and reactionary during the Chiang Kai-shek regime, and the “antisuperstition” campaign of the 1920s deemed many folk songs inappropriate for the
modernization of country.365 It was not until Mao’s Talks at Yan’an that folk culture was once
again celebrated – this time, due to its connection to the peasants, who were instrumental to the
Communist revolution.366
However, Mao not only re-popularized folk music, but also selectively changed its
characteristics.367 As Mao demanded that the only acceptable forms of art were those with
revolutionary meaning, folk music assimilated revolutionary lyrics and composers reintroduced
folk songs to the masses in more Westernized forms.368 On a superficial level, the purpose of
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this transformation, as stated by Mao in the Talks at Yan’an, was to promote the revolution.369
However, Mao differed from the other leaders and intellectuals before him who treated folk
music as a means to achieve political goals. Besides promoting revolution, Mao utilized folk
music to create a new national identity.370 Thus, beyond merely promoting folk music as others
leaders had done before, Mao actively controlled the artistic process and redefined the meaning
of “folk”.371
This myth of shared traditions that Mao promoted was especially significant to Han
nationalism, because it promoted the erasure of inter-Han differences.372 For example, to
overcome the communication difficulties associated with the multitude of mutually unintelligible
dialects within the Han community, the government was faced with the challenge of instituting a
national language.373 Although Mandarin was already the official language of China under the
Guomindang, the Communist Party reinstated an official language policy in 1956 to accelerate
the adoption of a national language.374 The instruction of singing in Mandarin and simultaneous
popularization of Mandarin songs became two important ways by which the government
promoted their language policy.375 Incidentally, the spread of Mandarin also affected min’ge,
which was traditionally sung in local dialects.376 Tuohy states, “Vocal music proved to be a
vehicle for the dissemination of national standard speech, and that speech became the dominant
language of the national musical voice”.377
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Still, some scholars believed this myth of shared traditions would be fragile and easily
rejected. For example, Eminov, in exploring the modernization of Chinese theater, states, “It
still remains to be seen whether the Chinese Communist Party's persuasive propaganda
techniques, as manifested in the modern theater as well as in other genres, are powerful and
subtle enough to eradicate a tradition so central to the lives of the people, and to replace it with
the products of modern socialist realism”.378 Similarly, Liu warns, “Insincere works, whether of
literature or music, which are composed simply to demonstrate loyalty to a political regime, will
in time fade away”.379 Westernized min’ge, which include refined versions of old revolutionary
songs, would therefore never be influential due to its politicization and artificiality.
However, in the case of min’ge, although many people still prefer traditional art forms of
the past, such as Beijing opera or traditional folk songs, it is clear that the CCP’s “persuasive
propaganda techniques” are indeed working.380 As Rees notes, “many Chinese musicians,
especially those professionally trained in national conservatories such as the Central
Conservatory and the China Conservatory in Beijing or the Shanghai Conservatory of Music, see
no contradiction in calling this modern style [of contemporary min’ge] ‘traditional’”.381
Furthermore, Professor Liu Huimin, a vocal instructor at the China Conservatory of Music, notes
that today, the term min’ge is synonymous with contemporary min’ge much more so than
traditional min’ge.382 If one is referring to traditional minority min’ge, for example, one would
have to use the term shaoshu minzu min’ge.383 This suggests that Mao’s policy of “coming from
the masses and going back to the masses” was extremely effective – more than 50 years later,
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even the professionals who would be aware of the politicization of min’ge accept contemporary
min’ge as traditional.
Beyond the categorization of this genre of music as both “folk” and “traditional”, it is
also important to note that Westernization is viewed as natural and inevitable in the process of
modernization. As explored in Chapter 2, the marching songs and patriotic anthems composed
for the Mass Singing Movement were all inspired by the desire to modernize China after the May
Fourth Movement of the early 1900s. During the May Fourth Movement and for many years
after, modernity was often equated to Westernization and thus new forms of popular music
continued to be Western importations.384 Liu discusses the development of this “New Music” as
follows:
“As one element of the relationship between China and the West since the mid nineteenth
century, the development of New Music in China over the past hundred years has been
motivated by a desire to emulate the music culture of the great powers of Europe and to
modernize, i.e., Europeanize, the ‘backward’ music of China. It has involved
experimenting with a range of ideas, from ‘Chinese learning as the essence, Western
learning for practical application’ to ‘total Westernization’. Although, superficially, this
does appear to have produced some music with a Chinese flavor, it has in face resulted in
the implementation of a policy in which education, performance, and composition have
all been dominated by European music”385
Although Liu could be dismissed as possessing a Eurocentric view, he also asserts his
optimism in the ability of Chinese music to develop independently. He states:
“The twenty-first century is the time when the Chinese music world should regain its
confidence, when it ceases to see the West as superior to the East, and does not need to see the
East as superior to the West but makes use of the power of the West to allow the full
development of the might of the East”386
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However, today, as so-called “traditional” styles such as min’ge become even more
influenced by Western classical styles, it appears that Chinese music may be moving in a
direction opposite of Liu’s predictions.
The changes in voice instruction, for example, illustrate the preference for Western styles.
In my interview with Professor Liu Huimin, she notes that the genre of min’ge today is not much
different from Western classical opera (mei sheng).387 She states, “The singing techniques are
essentially the same – the only thing different is the style (feng’ge)”.388 In my interview with
Professor Wang Sufen, another voice instructor at the China Conservatory of Music, she
conveyed a similar view of the recent developments of min’ge, noting that many min’ge voice
teachers at the university level will instruct their students to sing in a “Western operatic” way
and emphasize Western singing techniques to produce a fuller sound.389
This Westernization has produced a fundamental contradiction within the current
definition of “traditional” Chinese music that is applicable to min’ge. Hamm ironically notes in
his description of “light music” that many of these so-called “traditional” tunes sound like
“Muzak or Easy Listening FM programming” to Western ears.390 Likewise, when an ensemble
from the Central Conservatory of Music performed a program of “traditional” Chinese music in
Durham, England as a part of an Oriental Music Festival in 1979, foreign music scholars were
hesitant to accept it as authentic, due to the fact that the music used Western forms and
harmonies and featured modern European instruments.391 In response, the leader of the Chinese
delegation, Fang Kun, argued:
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“We really felt that they did not entirely understand the circumstances surrounding
Chinese music and its development… The pieces that we played were traditional pieces of either
classical or folk origin… Some of them contain many newly composed elements, some a few,
but all of them are linked to the same flesh and blood as Chinese traditional music. When we
selected a program like this it was because we recognized that in order to understand traditional
music, it is not only necessary to understand its classical and folk origins, but also to understand
its modern evolution… The approach that we suggest for traditional music is based on making
the past serve the present, weeding out the old to bring forth the new, selecting the fine and
discarding the rubbish, and eliminating the false and retaining the genuine”392
With this statement, Fang’s views seem to align with Mackerras’ view that folk music is
“a developing tradition and consequently subject to change”.393 In fact, many Chinese music
scholars dismissed the criticisms from foreign scholars as Eurocentric comments that intended to
discourage the development of Chinese music.394 However, even though the ability for Western
scholars to define traditional Chinese music is questionable, the continual Westernization of
min’ge highlights certain aspects of Chinese nationalism that are critical to the understanding of
both the Han identity and Han-minority relations.
Since the establishment of the PRC, government officials have recognized that singing is
an important element in constructing the state’s image.395 This image is the basis for influencing
popular nationalism, or how the citizens of China perceive themselves in relation to other
countries.396 For this reason, one of the first problems addressed by the Communications Office
of Musical Issues (Yinyue wenti tongxunbu) was whether conservatories should adopt Western
singing methods, or retain traditional methods of instruction.397 According to Tuohy, most music
scholars believed that schools should assimilate the best qualities of both, but under Mao,
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“something stained with the association of ‘foreign’ could be troublesome”.398 Therefore,
Western song forms were adopted but the singing techniques were still authentic to folk styles.399
After Mao, however, the increased Westernization of singing techniques reveals not only
a more welcoming attitude towards foreign influences, but also the desire for China to appear
more Westernized and modern on the global stage. The image of a Westernized, modern China
plays into the “victor” narrative outlined by Peter Gries, who notes that the CCP has relied on the
victor narrative to dispel the previous image of China as the “sick man of Asia”.400 In
comparison to the “victim” narrative, which is often xenophobic, the victor narrative, which
emphasizes how China “stood up” to the West and has successfully modernized while
maintaining “socialism with Chinese characteristics”, seems most relevant to min’ge today.
Contemporary min’ge, with its highly Westernized elements but Chinese flavor (or feng’ge) is
the epitome of the modern but distinctly “Chinese” image that the government strives to
achieve.401
Besides allowing the Chinese people to see themselves as equals to other Westernized
countries, the Westernization of min’ge also allows the Han to view themselves as more
advanced and superior to the “backward” minorities. Whereas the adoption of minority folk
songs often emphasizes the “otherness” of minority cultures, the Westernization of min’ge tends
to promote homogenization. This dynamic is particularly important within Han nationalism as
Gladney notes that the representation of the Han as “normal” and “un-exotic” is critical for
distinguishing the Han from the minorities.402 However, the Han identity is not only
strengthened through the exoticization of the minorities, but also through the proactive creation
398
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of cultural products that highlight the modernity and progress of the Han majority. Because the
concept of ethnic groups or minzu did not exist in China until the end of the Qing dynasty,
reinforcing the myth of a shared history and culture between the Han people has been a critical
part of nation-building.403 Within this nation-building process, the concept of the Han as being
the most civilized and advanced ethnic group has justified the Han majority’s authority to aid the
minorities in changing their “backward” ways.404 Thus, the Westernization of contemporary
min’ge, which is fundamentally a Han creation, reinforces the divide between the “modern” Han
and “backwards” minorities.
The portrayal of the Han as closer to modernity and the West is also reflected in the
performance of contemporary min’ge. For example, whereas traditional min’ge will often be
performed in the traditional dress of a certain minority, Westernized min’ge is performed in
Western concert attire (e.g. tuxedos and gowns).405 Furthermore, contemporary min’ge is often
placed in the same category as Western classical for singing competitions, while traditional
min’ge is considered a separate category.406 For example, in the Youth Vocal Singing
Competition (Qing Ge Sai), one of the most well known competitions for professionals, singers
can compete in the categories of contemporary min’ge and Western opera, but traditional
minority min’ge is separated into another competition by itself.407 Although difficulty in judging
the different styles of regional min’ge has been one of the considerations for this separation408,
this clear divide between traditional and contemporary min’ge reiterates the idea that
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contemporary min’ge represents progress and is therefore on par with the West, whereas
traditional min’ge cannot be judged by “modern” standards.
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Voices of Resistance
The cultural hegemony of the CCP has not existed without resistance. Baranovich, for
example, notes two prominent minority artists, Teng Ge’er and Lolo, who have been working to
create more realistic representations of their respective ethnic groups through their music.409
Like the voice of resistance that rock music provided in the 1980s, these artists have been
successful due to their popularity. For example, the song “The Land of the Blue Wolf” by Teng
Ge’er articulates a clear sense of opposition the state and Han control in Inner Mongolia.410 The
lyrics state:
The sun moves back and forth between the Tropic of Capricorn and the Tropic of Cancer
The herding people wander on the temperate grassland
I heard once
That the nomadic people were the masters of the mainland
Aha! Ya hu! A hu! Ya wei hu!
The sun comes up and goes away again
All thing on earth grow and then disappear
Several hundred years have already passed by in the world
My rulers of former days where are you now
Aha! Yu hu! A hu! Yu wei hu!
The steeds have lost their masters
The hunting dogs have lost their steeds
The land of the blue world is yellow sand
How lonely is the grassland in the wind
Aha! Yu hu! A hu! Yu wei hu!411
Such subversive lyrics would normally be prone to censorship and result in negative
consequences for the composer, but due to the widespread recognition of his music in Inner
Mongolia as well as Taiwan and Hong Kong, the government has allowed Teng Ge’er to become
a representative of the Mongolian people.412 After a brief period of censorship in 1992, Teng
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Ge’er has performed regularly on Chinese TV, including on state-controlled venues such as
CCTV programming.413
However, although Baranovich considers Teng Ge’er an example of successful resistance
from minorities in regards to reclaiming their identities, it is important to note certain limitations
to their resistance. For example, while the government has accepted Teng Ge’er as a
representative of the Mongolian people, CCTV only broadcasts his song, “The Mongol”, which
is much less radical and politically charged than “The Land of the Blue Wolf”.414 Furthermore,
Henochowicz notes that Teng Ge’er often sings songs promoting mainland Chinese identity,
reflecting compromises made to attract a larger audience and avoid political persecution.415 Thus,
political and economic interests often temper the resistance from minorities within the realm of
music.
Still, the growing popularity of minority artists who aspire to create a unique identity for
themselves and their ethic groups suggests that the cultural hegemony of the CCP may not be as
pervasive as before. For example, artists such as Hanggai, a Mongolian rock band, and Ablajan,
a Uyghur pop star, have gained significant popularity both within and outside of their home
bases.416 Although these artists nonetheless face the pressures of being monitored by the state, a
growing number of alternative performance sites and music festivals has allowed them to enjoy
an unusual degree of financial security and cultural prominence.417 Their success may indicate
an optimistic future for minorities reclaiming the representation of their identities through music
– one day, perhaps min’ge will be truly reflective of the diversity within China.
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CHAPTER 5
Conclusion

In Chapter 1, I established two main areas of exploration within this thesis: (1) the nature
of min’ge today, and (2) why the CCP supports and promotes min’ge. Here, I will summarize
my findings and relate my conclusions to the theories of nationalism discussed in the literature
review.

The Nature of Min’ge
Through my analysis of the changes within min’ge in Chapter 3, I was able distinguish
between traditional and contemporary min’ge. While traditional min’ge reflects the diversity of
the people, contemporary min’ge is a product of the CCP’s cultural hegemony, and therefore not
truly representative of the people. Because the preservation of traditional min’ge has been
difficult due to the persecution of folk singers during the Cultural Revolution and the
overwhelming influence of modern popular culture, contemporary min’ge has emerged as a
genre that assimilates aspects of traditional min’ge into Western forms. The politicization of
contemporary min’ge after the Yan’an Talks reflects the CCP’s control over cultural production
and significance, which I refer to as cultural hegemony. Through asserting this cultural
hegemony, the CCP has been able to shape min’ge into a mechanism for the promotion of
Chinese nationalism. However, there are unintended consequences from the promotion of this
genre – like the minzu policy, the min’ge policy was intended to encourage the minorities to
follow the Han example, but ultimately, it also allows minorities to distinguish and celebrate
their own identities.
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The Utility of Min’ge
One of the reasons why min’ge an ideal mechanism to the state is due to its ability to
bridge state nationalism, Han nationalism, popular nationalism, and pragmatic nationalism. In
terms of state nationalism, Huang Zhen’s 1982 speech on the Party’s policy towards the
performing arts of minority groups reflects the more tolerant and pluralistic attitudes in the
state’s cultural policies after the Cultural Revolution.418 As the only representation permitted
under Huang’s banner of promoting diversity is the “carefree and happy” minority, min’ge is an
extension of state nationalism which intends to celebrate China’s cultural policies. In reality,
however, contemporary min’ge exposes the relatively little progress that has been made in
addressing the marginalization of minorities.
The discrepancy between the image of minorities presented in min’ge and reality places
the shortcomings of the CCP’s cultural policies in the spotlight in a very literal sense. Indeed,
the pastoral image often emphasized in contemporary Mongolian min’ge contradicts the ethnic
tensions and environmental degradation present within Inner Mongolia today – similar to how
the gratefulness of the Tibetans for the Beijing-Lhasa express train expressed in “Road to
Heaven” completely dismisses the concerns that were raised during and after the construction of
the railroad. This clear contradiction between the minorities’ voices within min’ge and the lack
of voice from the people has caused significant tension and even inspired forms of resistance
from those familiar with minority issues. However, for the majority of the Chinese population,
the continuing popularity of min’ge reinforces its ability to undermine the voices of the
minorities and conceal the shortcomings of the CCP’s cultural policies in promoting equality and
diversity.
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In addition to weakening the voices of the minorities, min’ge also serves to strengthen the
unity of the Han people through promoting the myth of a shared identity and asserting Han
superiority. In line with the theory of ethnosymbolism, because hanzu is an artificial concept, it
must be maintained through a variety of mechanisms, such as promoting a common language,
redefining folk traditions, and emphasizing the “otherness” of the non-Han.419 As detailed in
Chapter 4, min’ge has played a pivotal role within each of these mechanisms. Beyond
strengthening the Han identity, min’ge also serves to legitimize the CCP’s rule. The repetition of
symbols of otherness within contemporary min’ge such as the sexualized female form,
stereotypically “exotic” musical patterns, and appreciative attitude of the minorities reinforces
the view that the minorities are less civilized than the Han, and therefore require guidance and
modernization. Simultaneously, the Westernization of min’ge portrays the Han as more modern
and advanced, alluding to their role as the “vanguard of the revolution”, and justifying their
dominating position as the leaders of the country. In this way, the Han nationalism evoked by
min’ge serves both to create a sense of unity among the Han, and to legitimize power of the more
“civilized” majority.
While it is clear that min’ge creates false representations of both minorities and the Han,
the problematic elements of min’ge are often difficult to detect because they have been accepted
as the “norm”, and – particularly in regards to the exoticization of minority min’ge – often serve
as crucial selling points. The hidden nature of these dynamics is what also makes min’ge so
powerful, as posited by the idea of banal nationalism.420 Thus, despite the very obvious
distortions of reality, immensely popular songs such as “Road to Heaven” and “The Beautiful
Grassland is My Home” are able to maintain a favorable image of the government and Han-
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minority relations. The government has also bolstered the recognition and airtime of min’ge on
popular state sponsored programs such as the Chinese New Year Gala on CCTV (China Central
Television), where over half of these programs is consistently devoted to min’ge.421 This statesponsored promotion of min’ge suggests that the CCP’s policy of “coming from the masses and
going back to the masses” from the mass line ideology is still effective. As these “refined”
versions of traditional folk songs are assimilated into the mainstream, their artificiality is often
ignored which validates their utility to the state.
Min’ge may also play an important role in external nationalism.422 Popular nationalism, a
type of external nationalism as explored in Chapter 1, is often xenophobic and influenced to a
great extent by the victim narrative. However, while some famous min’ge songs such as “My
Motherland” that were written during wartime have shades of xenophobia423, contemporary
min’ge today mainly focuses on the greatness of China and its achievements. This shift away
from the victim narrative perpetuated by Jiang Zemin towards a victor narrative reflects the
general caution of the government towards popular nationalism, and suggests that min’ge may be
an extension of pragmatic nationalism. In fact, as tensions in the South China have not ceased,
the CCP may be incentivized to monitor any xenophobic popular nationalism that may pressure
the state to take unnecessarily aggressive actions. Furthermore, the victor narrative plays into
the idea of “Chinese exceptionalism”, where China is able to modernize without democratizing
or following an entirely Western model. A part of this Chinese exceptionalism draws on the
historical notion that China was once the “Middle Kingdom” with the most powerful and
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advanced society in the world.424 The Westernization of min’ge, therefore, reflects the desire to
emphasize the modernization of China while simultaneously highlighting the distinctiveness of
Chinese culture.
Thus, my initial hypothesis that min’ge is more relevant to internal nationalism must be
rejected. While I hypothesized that min’ge would be more relevant to internal nationalism
because its popularity is limited to mainland China and its subject matter often draws from ethnic
minorities, I have discovered through in-depth analyses that the scope of the utility of min’ge
extends to external nationalism. In terms of internal nationalism, it functions to hide the CCP’s
cultural policy failures and promote Han unity and superiority. The cultural hegemony that is the
foundation for min’ge also exacerbates ethnic tensions, as the privilege of representation is
limited to the Han. However, in a broader sense, min’ge creates the image of a “modern” and
“Westernized” Chinese people, which is important to not only monitor xenophobic sentiments
common to popular nationalism, but also to emphasize Chinese exceptionalism. The utility of
min’ge is also strengthened by its hidden nature and popularity, which ensures that its messages
will continue to be unconsciously accepted by the masses.
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Final Comments
Despite the cautionary and critical nature of my thesis, I cannot conclude without
qualifying any condemnation of the CCP. Indeed, it is unfair to point to the politicization of
min’ge and its appropriation of folk traditions as a unique phenomenon. First, the politicization
of music in China has roots in the early 20th century, as explored in Chapter 2. Furthermore, the
CCP’s cultural hegemony follows a Soviet model, as the appropriation of folk music was often a
straightforward extension of the policies of Communist regimes following World War II.425 The
manipulation of folklore is also common to non-Communist states, however. Gladney notes that
the invention of folklore in Germany was “based upon 19th-century romanticist attempts to
describe the unity of their nation based on a common cultural and historical heritage that was
reconstructed from relics of ancient traditions in German folk customs and narratives”.426
Folklore in Latin America has also been manipulated by ruling elites. Kaarsholm and James note
that in Argentina and Brazil, folklore “became part of the legitimation of 1940s and 1950s
populism through which leaders attempted to keep an ear to the ground and shape policy in
accord with perceived responses from ‘the people’”.427 Thus, while min’ge plays into China’s
narrative of exceptionalism, it is clear that China is not so exceptional after all.
However, despite its obvious exploitation of folk tradition, the solution to appropriation is
not simple – Harris points out that the legal protection of indigenous peoples’ cultural assets is
often not protected by domestic or international law.428 Moreover, the development of min’ge
has led to certain benefits for minority musicians. In addition to the economic benefits
mentioned in Chapter 3, the popularity of min’ge has also allowed minority musicians to push
425
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the boundaries of representation within the CCP’s system of cultural hegemony. This reflects
the contradictory role folk music can play in the creation of a unified national identity, as posited
by the theory of ethnosymbolism. As musicians such as Teng Ge’er and Hanggai slowly gain
recognition, their music may turn the tides of Han nationalism in favor of ethnic nationalism, just
as the popularization of Serbian folk epics during the 1990s was a form of resistance against
nationalist tensions. In that case, min’ge would have achieved the opposite of what the CCP
intended – as minorities reclaim their music, their voices become all the more powerful.
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APPENDIX

FIGURE 1. Performance of traditional minority min’ge.

Source:
Huffington Post, “Spectacular Chinese Performance at World Peace Gala in Chicago”, 2011.
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jim-luce/spectacular-chinese-perfo_b_421001.html
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FIGURE 2. Performance of Westernized min’ge.

Source:
All-China Women’s Federation, “Song Zuying Performs in Los Angeles”, 2013.
http://www.womenofchina.cn/womenofchina/html1/news/celebrity/15/770-1.htm
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